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Scholars have increasingly focused on the relevance of post-Founding
historical practice to discerning the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive Branch, and the Supreme Court has recently
endorsed the relevance of such practice. Much less attention has been
paid, however, to the relevance of historical practice to discerning the
separation of powers between the political branches and the federal
judiciary—what this Article calls the “judicial separation of powers.” As
the Article explains, there are two ways that historical practice might be
relevant to the judicial separation of powers. First, such practice might
be invoked as an appeal to “historical gloss”—a claim that the practice
informs the content of constitutional law. Second, historical practice
might be invoked to support nonlegal but obligatory norms of proper
governmental behavior—something that Commonwealth theorists refer
to as “constitutional conventions.” To illustrate how both gloss and
conventions enrich our understanding of the judicial separation of powers, the Article considers the authority of Congress to “pack” the Supreme Court and the authority of Congress to “strip” the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. This Article shows that, although the defeat of Franklin
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in 1937 has been studied almost exclusively from a political perspective, many criticisms of the plan involved
claims about historical gloss; other criticisms involved appeals to constitutional conventions; and still others blurred the line between those two
categories or shifted back and forth between them. Strikingly similar
themes emerge in debates in Congress in 1957–1958, and within the
Justice Department in the early 1980s, over the authority of Congress to
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prevent the Court from deciding constitutional issues by restricting its
appellate jurisdiction. The Article also shows—based on internal Executive Branch documents that have not previously been discovered or
discussed in the literature—how Chief Justice John Roberts, while working in the Justice Department and debating Office of Legal Counsel head
Theodore Olson, failed to persuade Attorney General William French
Smith that Congress has broad authority to strip the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. The Article then reflects on the implications of historical
gloss and conventions for the judicial separation of powers more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
The practices of governmental institutions since the constitutional Founding
are a potential source of normative guidance in separation of powers controversies. There are at least two ways that such practices might be relevant to
constitutional analysis. First, these practices might be invoked as an appeal to
“historical gloss”—a claim that the practice informs the content of constitutional law. Such appeals are common when legal academics confront constitutional issues relating to the distribution of authority between Congress and the
executive branch,1 and recent endorsements of gloss by the Supreme Court—in
Zivotofsky v. Kerry and NLRB v. Noel Canning—came in that context.2 By
contrast, surprisingly little work has examined the potential relevance of postFounding governmental practice to discerning the separation of powers between
the political branches and the courts.3
Second, instead of informing the content of legal norms, historical governmental practice might be invoked in support of what British (and more broadly,
Commonwealth) legal and political theorists have termed “constitutional conventions.” Such conventions, as Keith Whittington has explained, may be “understood as maxims, beliefs, and principles that guide officials in how they exercise
political discretion.”4 To act contrary to a convention, as Whittington further
notes, “is to violate the spirit of the constitution, even if it does not violate any
particular rule.”5 There has been less attention in legal scholarship to conventions than to gloss. To the extent that this scholarship has considered conven-

1. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
2. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (relying on historical practice relating to
the recognition of foreign sovereigns and their territories); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2559 (2014) (relying on historical practice relating to recess appointments).
3. An exception is Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1835 (2015), which considers how the political branches have reasoned about jurisdiction-stripping and
asks whether courts should credit that reasoning. Unlike this Article, Grove’s article does not consider
broader theoretical issues surrounding the role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation, and
it does not consider the relevance of such practice for constitutional conventions. For a history of
judicial independence that identifies conventional protections (but does not analyze the concept of
conventions), see CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006).
4. Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860.
5. Id. at 1852.
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tions, it has (as with scholarship on gloss) primarily focused on the interactions
between the political branches of the national government.
This Article examines the role of both historical gloss and constitutional
conventions in interpretive debates about the distribution of authority between
the political branches and the courts—what the Article calls the “judicial
separation of powers.” To do so, it considers two longstanding issues raised
when one or both political branches have sought to affect the Supreme Court’s
decision making: the authority of Congress to pack the Court, and the authority
of Congress to strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
According to the conventional wisdom among scholars, the political branches
“[o]f course” can “exercise some control over the Court . . . by changing the
size of the Court (which has happened seven times over the years),”6 even
though most scholars are quick to add that Congress ought not to do so as a
“policy” matter. Although more contested, the conventional wisdom also holds
that Congress can “create issue-based exceptions to the Supreme Court’s [appellate] jurisdiction,”7 even though, again, most scholars believe that it would be
bad policy for Congress to do so. Under this view, it makes no difference to the
constitutional analysis if Congress adds Justices due to specific disagreements
with the Court’s decisions (a narrow definition of “Court-packing”), or for the
purpose of more generally influencing the Court’s decision making going
forward (a broader definition of “Court-packing”). Nor does it matter constitutionally if a congressional restriction on the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
reflects disagreement with the Court’s actual or expected decision making
(which this Article defines as “Court-stripping”).
The conventional wisdom about Court-packing is thought to be confirmed by
the debate in 1937 over President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) plan to
expand the size of the Supreme Court. That debate has been extensively studied
by both historians and legal scholars—so much so that it might seem unlikely
that there would be anything new to say about it. Most discussions of the defeat
of FDR’s plan, however, have focused on the lack of sufficient political demand
for Court-packing—resulting from, for example, the purported “switch in time”
by the Supreme Court in its approach to the New Deal.8 In part because of that
focus, no one has yet considered the debate from the perspective of either
historical gloss or constitutional conventions.9 As this Article will show by
6. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 318 (7th ed. 2015).
7. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1064 (2010); see
also PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 438 (8th ed. 2014) (“Many respected commentators—enough so that this can
be called the traditional view—believe that Congress has the power to make exceptions to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over any category of cases, constitutional or otherwise.”).
8. See infra Section II.E.
9. Adrian Vermeule has usefully written about both constitutional conventions and the Courtpacking debate, but he has not connected the topics. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions]; Adrian
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reviewing the Senate hearings and other materials from 1937, many criticisms
of the Court-packing plan involved claims about historical gloss, which were
often tied to claims about the constitutional structure. Other criticisms involved
appeals to nonlegal but obligatory constitutional conventions. And still others
blurred the line between those two categories or shifted back and forth between
them.
Strikingly similar themes emerge in debates over the authority of Congress to
prevent the Court from deciding particular constitutional issues by restricting its
appellate jurisdiction. In the academy, defenders of plenary congressional power
have tended to view the issue as a policy matter for the political branches to
decide, and they have based that conclusion primarily on the perceived clarity
of the Exceptions Clause in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, as well as
on its asserted original meaning, general structural commitments, and the
Court’s Reconstruction Era decision in Ex parte McCardle.10 Academic opponents of Court-stripping have emphasized Section 2’s lack of clarity, other
language in Article III, other Founding-Era evidence or expectations, and a
more muscular structural vision of the role of the Court in the federal system.
Opponents have also read McCardle narrowly, especially in light of the Court’s
assumption of jurisdiction a few months later in Ex parte Yerger.11
When one turns from the academic debate to decades of debates in the
political branches over various Court-stripping proposals, a richer interpretive
picture emerges. To be sure, government officials and witnesses testifying
before Congress defended their positions in those debates by making arguments
that can be categorized as textualist, originalist, structuralist, or doctrinalist. But
as this Article will show, officials and witnesses have also often relied upon
historical gloss, and they have tied gloss to the constitutional structure. In other
instances, they have effectively invoked a constitutional convention against
Court-stripping. And in still other instances, they have not been clear about
whether they were making a constitutional or a conventional claim, but they
have appealed to normative commitments that transcend policy preferences.
This Article cannot examine all of the numerous Court-stripping debates in
the political branches. Instead, it will offer suggestive evidence by focusing on
two debates in particular: the congressional debate in 1957 and 1958 about
proposals to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving alleged subversive activities, and the debate within the Justice Department in the early 1980s about efforts to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction over
cases involving school prayer, busing, and abortion. In the latter debate, internal
Executive Branch documents, two of which were released publicly for the first
Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154 (2006) [hereinafter
Vermeule, Political Constraints]. Without considering the 1937 debate, David Pozen has suggested that
there is a convention against Court-packing. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of
Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 34, 69 (2014).
10. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
11. 75 U.S. 85 (8 Wall.) (1868). For discussion of those debates, see infra Section III.A.
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time to the authors of this Article, show that Chief Justice John Roberts, while
working in the Justice Department, championed the traditional academic view
that Congress has broad authority to engage in Court-stripping. Importantly,
however, his argument failed to persuade then-Attorney General William French
Smith, who sided with Theodore Olson, the head of the Office of Legal
Counsel. This episode is unknown to most scholars writing on the subject.
The primary purpose of this Article is to unveil certain forms of constitutional
and conventional arguments in high-stakes debates over judicial independence,
not to determine the soundness of those arguments. It therefore does not opine
on the ultimate constitutionality of Court-packing or Court-stripping. The materials described in this Article show, however, that for the actual participants in
debates over Court-packing and Court-stripping, the constitutional questions
have been perceived to be more serious, and more complex, than previous
accounts have suggested.
The issues of judicial independence considered in this Article are of continuing importance. For example, while the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges
was considering whether the Constitution protects same-sex marriage,12 a member of Congress introduced a bill proposing to strip the federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over marriage cases.13 This proposal received little support, even though there were many critics of same-sex marriage
in Congress. Other commentators have usefully identified political safeguards
that make it difficult to enact such legislation.14 This Article helps explain why
such Court-stripping proposals are likely to encounter not only political opposition, but also constitutional and conventional objections. More recently, historical practice, not constitutional text or original meaning, dominated the debate in
the wake of Justice Scalia’s death over when and how the Senate is obliged to
respond to a presidential nomination to fill a Supreme Court vacancy.15
Part I briefly explains both the historical gloss approach and the concept of
constitutional conventions. Parts II and III show how gloss and conventions
were invoked in prominent debates over Court-packing and Court-stripping.
Part IV reflects on the implications of historical gloss and conventions for the
judicial separation of powers more generally.

12. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13. See Restrain the Judges on Marriage Act of 2015, H.R. 1968, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced by
Rep. Steve King).
14. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (2011); Vermeule, Political Constraints, supra note 9.
15. See Curtis Bradley & Neil Siegel, Constitutional Conventions, the Judicial Separation of
Powers, and Justice Scalia’s Replacement, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 14, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com.br/
2016/02/constitutional-conventions-judicial.html [https://perma.cc/9EQR-PTXD]; see also Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, Essay, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say
About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 53, 105 (2016) (“Virtually everyone who has weighed in on the process for filling the seat left
vacant by Justice Scalia’s death considers historical practice relevant . . . .”).
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I. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
A. THE HISTORICAL GLOSS APPROACH

When analyzing the distribution of constitutional authority between Congress
and the President, both courts and political actors often give weight to longstanding practices of the government.16 Giving weight to such practices is sometimes
referred to as the “historical gloss” approach to constitutional interpretation,
based on Justice Frankfurter’s discussion of the concept in his concurrence in
the Youngstown steel seizure case. Justice Frankfurter observed that “[i]t is an
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to
the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon them.”17 Applying this observation to the assessment of executive authority, he contended that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, . . . may be
treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art.
II.”18
Although the Supreme Court has invoked historical practice in a number of
separation of powers decisions, it recently gave an especially strong endorsement to practice in construing the scope of the President’s recess appointments
authority in NLRB v. Noel Canning.19 In part because “the interpretive questions
before us concern the allocation of power between two elected branches of
Government,” the Court wrote that it would “put significant weight upon
historical practice.”20 The Court also made clear that practice is “an important
interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject
to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”21
Reliance on historical practice is even more common in legal reasoning
within the Executive Branch than it is in the courts, especially regarding
separation of powers issues for which there is little judicial precedent. This is
true, for instance, in the area of foreign affairs. To take one prominent and fairly
recent example, in 2011 the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) gave significant weight to historical practice in concluding that President
Obama had the constitutional authority to use military force in Libya without
first seeking congressional authorization.22 Citing past instances involving presidential uses of force, OLC contended that “[t]his historical practice is an
16. See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–24.
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 610–11.
19. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical
Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (analyzing
the Court’s uses of historical practice in Noel Canning).
20. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559.
21. Id. at 2560.
22. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass to the Attorney Gen. 7 (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZV7E-SYJG].
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important indication of constitutional meaning, because it reflects the two
political branches’ practical understanding, developed since the founding of the
Republic, of their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national
defense.”23
Although courts and government officials commonly employ the historical
gloss approach in the separation of powers area, the contours of the approach
are not fully defined.24 There is no precise metric for knowing what constitutes
qualifying practice or how long it must be followed in order to be credited.
Moreover, as with all efforts to apply custom to determine legal rules, there are
inevitably questions about the proper level of generality at which to describe the
past practice. Furthermore, although formulations of gloss in congressional–
executive conflicts often purport to require some degree of acquiescence in the
actions of the other branch by the branch or house of Congress whose prerogatives are implicated by the practice, it is not clear what constitutes sufficient
acquiescence.25 Actual applications of gloss, including in Noel Canning, have
not tended to be as demanding as Justice Frankfurter’s formulation, especially
his reference to practice “never before questioned.”26
Nor is it always clear how the historical gloss approach fits with other
approaches to constitutional interpretation. There is tension between this approach and strict versions of originalism, because the gloss approach hypothesizes that constitutional meaning can be established by practice long after the
Founding. The tension is even greater if one accepts that constitutional meaning
can change over time as a result of gloss. To be sure, some originalists accept
the idea that practice can “liquidate” the meaning of ambiguous constitutional
text.27 The relationship between the historical gloss approach and the concept of
liquidation is uncertain because little has been written about liquidation. Depending on how it is defined, liquidation may differ from gloss to the extent that it
primarily emphasizes early practice, disallows room for constitutional change
after some initial instance of liquidation, or imposes more demanding requirements than gloss before a liquidation can be reopened and reliquidated.28
Less strict versions of originalism appear more amenable to gloss. For
example, variants of “new originalism,” which emphasize the idea of “constitu-

23. Id.
24. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 424 (noting various uncertainties surrounding the gloss
approach).
25. See id. at 432–38; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (noting that the extent to which a showing of institutional acquiescence should be required
depends on the justification for relying on historical gloss); Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 (2016) (arguing that a strong showing of institutional acquiescence
should be required before crediting gloss).
26. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 19, at 21.
27. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–53
(2003).
28. For preliminary thoughts on potential differences between gloss and liquidation, see Bradley &
Siegel, supra note 19, at 29–41.

2017]

JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF POWERS

263

tional construction” as an enterprise distinct from constitutional interpretation,
seem to allow a role for post-Founding practice in informing such construction.29 Similarly, Jack Balkin’s theory of “framework originalism”—which
views the Constitution as providing “an initial framework for governance that
sets politics in motion”—is compatible with relying on historic governmental
practice to build upon the framework.30
Whatever the compatibility of historical gloss with various forms of originalism, the gloss approach is more naturally aligned with nonoriginalist approaches. It overlaps with Burkean and common law approaches to constitutional
interpretation, because it both credits the past and allows room for incremental
change.31 Gloss also overlaps with theories that would give weight to “nonjudicial precedent”32 or particular governmental “showdowns,”33 although gloss
is focused more on the long-term accretion of practice than on specific decisions
or events. In addition, gloss bears some resemblance to popular constitutionalism, although gloss focuses on governmental practices rather than on broader
social movements or the evolving traditions of the American people. More
generally, gloss is consistent with an increased emphasis in constitutional theory
in recent years on the idea of constitutional law outside the courts.34
The relationship of historical gloss to the constitutional text, like its relationship to constitutional theory, is also somewhat unclear. Often, gloss (as its name
suggests) is invoked to help clarify purportedly ambiguous text, such as the
Recess Appointments Clause in Noel Canning.35 Under Justice Frankfurter’s
formulation from Youngstown, gloss would help give content to the more
general “executive Power” vested in the President by Article II, Section 1, of the
Constitution.36 Similarly, as discussed in Part II, the historical practice of
Congress regarding changes to the size of the Supreme Court can be thought of
as a gloss on the meaning of the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper
29. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUMEANING (1999).
30. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011).
31. Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
892–94 (1996).
32. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008).
33. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
991 (2008).
34. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
35. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (“[I]n interpreting the Clause, we put
significant weight upon historical practice.”).
36. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). For debate about whether the Vesting Clause was originally understood to confer authority
on the President beyond the powers otherwise specified in Article II, compare Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (yes), with
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 545 (2004) (no).
TIONAL
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Clause of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which is the principal
(although under-determinate) textual source of Congress’s power to set the size
of the Court. In addition, as discussed in Part III, the historical practice of
Congress regarding the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be
thought of as a gloss on the meaning of the Exceptions Clause of Article III,
Section 2.
In other instances, however, gloss is invoked to fill in perceived gaps in the
constitutional text, which is distinct from the idea of glossing the text. For
example, although the text specifies the process by which the United States can
join treaties—by obtaining presidential approval with two-thirds senatorial
advice and consent37—it does not specify the process by which the United
States can terminate its treaty commitments, and the Executive Branch has
invoked historical practice in support of the proposition that the President has a
unilateral power of termination.38 Similarly, the President’s power to recognize
foreign sovereigns, addressed in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, is not referenced in the
constitutional text.39 As Justice Frankfurter explained in Youngstown, although
“[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant
the Constitution or legislation,” they can “give meaning to the words of a text or
supply them.”40
To be sure, constitutional interpreters still often invoke provisions of the
constitutional text in these gap-filling contexts, so it is not clear to what extent
historical practice is operating independently of the text. Michael Dorf has
argued that the existence of a written Constitution in the United States makes it
difficult to formulate freestanding claims based on historical practice. “Because
of the widespread but mistaken belief that the Constitution alone grounds legal
authority,” he contends, “political actors feel the need to search for a constitutional hook for arguments that customary rules should be obeyed,” which has
“lamentable consequences” in part because “for some customary rules, there is
no readily available hook, and as a consequence, political actors may be
tempted to violate them.”41
Although there is substantial truth to Dorf’s observation, it may be overstated
because it tends to conflate the Constitution with the constitutional text. As this
Article shows in discussing both Court-packing and Court-stripping, practicebased claims can be linked to potentially persuasive claims about the requirements of the constitutional structure, as opposed to specific text. Moreover,
37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
38. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773
(2014) (discussing how presidents have, in the absence of judicial review, incrementally expanded
executive power to terminate treaties unilaterally).
39. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (“Despite the importance of the recognition power in foreign
relations, the Constitution does not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II or elsewhere.”).
40. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
41. Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 75 (Matthew D. Adler &
Kenneth Einar Himma eds. 2009).
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some well-established exercises of governmental authority, generally thought
today to be constitutional, seem in tension with the text—for example, the
Senate’s practice of giving only consent, not advice, on treaties;42 the frequent
conclusion by Presidents of “executive agreements” in lieu of Article II treaties;43 and Congress’s assignment of adjudicatory authority to administrative
law judges and other personnel who lack the tenure and salary protections
mandated by Article III.44 Furthermore, one should not assume that the perceived clarity or ambiguity of the text is unaffected by other modalities of
constitutional interpretation, including gloss.45
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

Historical gloss, which has the authority of constitutional law, is not the only
way in which historical practice might enable or constrain exercises of governmental authority. Instead of creating binding legal norms, such practice might
generate what British (and more broadly, Commonwealth) legal and political
theorists have termed “constitutional conventions,” which are “maxims, beliefs,
and principles that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion.”46
As Keith Whittington has observed, to act contrary to a convention “is to violate
the spirit of the constitution, even if it does not violate any particular rule.”47
Britain has an unwritten constitution, and British commentators—most famously, Albert Venn Dicey during the late nineteenth century—have distinguished between constitutional law and constitutional conventions on the basis
of judicial enforceability.48 As Dicey explained, British constitutional law includes only judicially enforceable rules, while constitutional conventions “consist of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which, . . . regulate the
conduct of the several members of the sovereign power, . . . [but] are not in
reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the Courts.”49 Importantly,
42. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (2d ed. 2015).
43. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 961 (2001).
44. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 234 (1990) (“Congress may leave the initial adjudication of some or
all of [A]rticle III’s list of cases to the state courts, but if federal adjudication is felt to be needed, the
requirements of [A]rticle III automatically come into play and specify what sorts of courts Congress
must employ for federal adjudication.”). But see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III
Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 651 (2004) (contending
that “tribunals” created by Congress under Article I need not be staffed by life-tenured judges because
“Article III does not formally invest these tribunals with the judicial power of the United States,” but
that they “must remain inferior to the Supreme Court and the judicial department”).
45. For an argument that the perceived ambiguity or clarity of the constitutional text is partially
constructed, in part by historical practice, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed
Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015).
46. Whittington, supra note 4, at 1860.
47. Id. at 1852.
48. See A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION chs. 14–15
(London, MacMillan & Co. 3d ed. 1889).
49. Id. at 24.
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Dicey viewed conventions as obligatory, even though not judicially enforceable.
A convention specifies how discretionary governmental power “ought to be
exercised,” Dicey wrote, although the obligation it imposes has political and
moral status rather than legal status.50 Under this account, violating a constitutional convention is considered a breach of “constitutional morality.”51 That is,
the violation constitutes not simply bad policy, but a deviation from norms of
good institutional citizenship that help sustain the constitutional system.
At times, theorists have considered the extent to which the concept of
constitutional conventions applies to constitutional practice in the United States.
In 1925, for example, Herbert Horwill, a scholar at Oxford University, published a study entitled The Usages of the American Constitution.52 Invoking
Dicey, Horwill explained that, although conventions are considered part of the
British Constitution, they “are not laws at all but mere usages.”53 Like Dicey
before him, Horwill observed that the United States, like Great Britain, had
various “customs, practices, maxims and precepts which are not enforced by the
courts, and which thus correspond to the English [constitutional conventions].”54 As an example, Horwill pointed to “the understanding that Presidential Electors shall not cast their votes according to their independent judgment
but shall do no more than formally ratify the results of a previous popular
vote.”55
Although the distinction between constitutional law and constitutional conventions offers a useful way of thinking about certain practice-based norms relating
to the operations of the U.S. government, translating the concept to U.S.
constitutional law requires care. Most notably, the sharp distinction that Dicey
drew between law and judicially unenforceable norms of governmental practice
is problematic in the United States for at least two reasons.56 First, the political
question and other nonjusticiability doctrines presuppose that certain questions
50. Id. at 346.
51. Id.
52. HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1925); see also Pozen, supra
note 9, at 29–39 (discussing the concept of constitutional conventions and considering their relevance
to U.S. separation of powers).
53. HORWILL, supra note 52, at 5.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. This convention came under pressure in the wake of the November 2016 presidential
election. See, e.g., Kyle Cheney, Democratic Presidential Electors Revolt Against Trump: The Electoral
College Could See a Historic Number of “Faithless” Electors, POLITICO (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.
politico.com/story/2016/11/democrats-electoral-college-faithless-trump-231731 [https://perma.cc/L7WURULM].
56. Dicey developed his account against the background of an Austinian conception of law, which
views formal sanctions as a crucial element of law. This conception has been disputed by modern legal
theorists, most notably H.L.A. Hart, who instead have defined law in terms of an internalized sense of
obligation. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 3 (1961). But see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE
OF LAW, at ix (2015) (questioning “whether force and coercion are as irrelevant to explaining the nature
of law as perhaps Hart and certainly his legions of followers have assumed”). In part due to Hart’s
influence, some modern Commonwealth theorists reject the sharp distinction that Dicey drew between
law and conventions. See, e.g., SIR IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 74 (5th ed. 1959);
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of constitutional law will be resolved outside the courts,57 and modern academic
writings on popular constitutionalism readily accept that constitutional law
extends beyond what courts do.58 As a result, the mere fact that practice-based
norms of governmental conduct might not be judicially enforceable would not,
in the United States, automatically cause them to fall outside the domain of
constitutional law. Second, as illustrated by decisions like Noel Canning, some
practice-based norms of governmental conduct are judicially enforceable in the
United States.59
In order to better accord with jurisprudential understandings of U.S. law, it is
useful to distinguish between practice-based norms that have legal status (in
which case they would constitute historical gloss) and those that do not (in
which case they would constitute constitutional conventions), regardless of
whether they are subject to judicial review.60 Such a distinction might rest on
either empirical or normative grounds.61 Under an empirical approach, what
would make a practice-based norm nonlegal would be an understanding by
members of the relevant interpretive community that breach of the norm was
not a violation of the law—even though they understood breach to be improper.
A possible example was the norm, prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Second
Amendment in 1951, against presidents serving more than two terms. The
constitutional text did not limit the number of presidential terms, but George
Washington stepped down after two, and it was generally thought thereafter that
it would be improper to deviate from his example.62 This norm does not appear,
however, to have been viewed as binding constitutional law: a number of

GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
12–13 (1984).
57. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 184 (2d ed. 1986); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(“The issue . . . is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is
for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”). The political question
doctrine can be thought of as a strong form of respect for practice—that is, allowing the relations
between the branches to be worked out by practice rather than judicial decision. See Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 1, at 430.
58. See supra note 34.
59. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note
19 (discussing the Court’s reliance on historical practice in Noel Canning).
60. Although he does not consider the concept of historical gloss in detail, Adrian Vermeule has
suggested that, because gloss involves governmental practices that have obligatory status, it should
simply be considered a species of constitutional conventions. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in
Court, 38 DUBLIN UNIV. L.J. 283, 284 (2015). Lumping gloss with conventions, however, obscures how
the nature of the obligation associated with gloss is specifically legal in character, whereas this need not
be true of conventions. See id. at 288 (describing conventions as resting on “precepts of political
morality”).
61. By analogy, some rights determinations—such as whether imposing capital punishment contravenes evolving standards of decency, or whether an asserted liberty right is fundamental—may turn on
empirical or normative considerations, or both. For a discussion, see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1525–27 (6th ed. 2015).
62. See JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 115 (2d ed. 1916)
(“[I]t may now be said to be a part of the unwritten constitution that no President is eligible to a third

268

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:255

presidents considered running for a third term, and Franklin Roosevelt did so
(and successfully ran for a fourth term).63
In addition to an empirical analysis, there might be normative bases for
assigning legal status to a practice-based norm, stemming from constitutional or
political theory. As Whittington notes in discussing the circumstances under
which a certain practice should be deemed obligatory (although not necessarily
legally binding), someone might conclude that a practice should be treated as
obligatory, “even if political participants do not themselves recognize it,”
because assigning the practice this status “would be useful in better effectuating
constitutional goals.”64 The same observation potentially applies in determining
whether a practice-based norm has legal status.
Although the idea of conventions may be less familiar to students of the
American constitutional system than to students of Commonwealth legal systems, a potential value of the conventions category in the U.S. system is that it
allows some understandings relating to the separation of powers to have normative force without carrying the same limits on flexibility and defeasibility that
might be associated with categorizing them as law. Relatedly, the conventions
category could operate as a “way station” for some norms between the purely
political realm and the legal realm, so that participants in constitutional practice
have an opportunity to apply the norm over an extended period of time before
deciding whether to accord it legal significance.65 Nevertheless, as Parts II and
III will show, it can be difficult to distinguish between conventions, which are
viewed as obligatory only for nonlegal reasons, and historical gloss, which is
viewed as obligatory at least partly for legal reasons. There may also be
differing understandings of that question regarding the same practice, both at a
given point in time and over time. This uncertainty is especially likely to exist
absent judicial review, because there is often less need to be precise about the
issue of legal status when practice-based norms are discussed and enforced
outside the courts.66
C. CONCLUSION

As noted above, scholarship in the United States on both historical gloss and
constitutional conventions has generally focused on the relationship between
term.”). But see HORWILL, supra note 52, at 99 (“The usage, if usage it be, is not so firmly established as
absolutely to deter an ambitious man from making the venture.”).
63. Presidents and their supporters contemplated the possibility of a third term on a number of
occasions prior to Roosevelt. See MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
POWER, PRINCIPLES & POLITICS 43–78 (2011); Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future
President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 579–84
(1999).
64. Whittington, supra note 4, at 1853.
65. For an examination of how certain forms of federalism reasoning can act as a way station
between political and legal understandings of individual rights claims, see Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as
a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87 (2014).
66. As discussed in Part IV, however, Executive Branch lawyers may need to be precise about the
question of legal status when they are assessing the legality of proposed conduct.
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Congress and the executive branch. The federal judiciary, however, is also an
important part of the separation of powers framework, and there is no inherent
reason why gloss and conventions would not be relevant in assessing issues
relating to the independence and authority of the federal courts—that is, to the
judicial separation of powers. The next two parts—on Court-packing and
Court-stripping—illustrate how government officials and respected witnesses in
congressional hearings have consulted historical practice to reason through
difficult normative questions relating to the judicial separation of powers. The
Article focuses on those two examples in part because they each involve
well-known challenges to judicial independence, regarding which there is extensive historical practice. But the Article also focuses on them because efforts to
pack the Court or strip its appellate jurisdiction have arisen during periods of
intense political controversy—contexts in which it might seem unlikely that one
would find serious, sustained argumentation about normative constraints imposed by either the Constitution or conventions. The history suggests otherwise.
II. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND COURT-PACKING
A. TEXT AND HISTORY

Consider a 2007 op-ed in The New York Times written by the prominent
biographer Jean Edward Smith.67 Expressing concern about the Roberts Court’s
“manifestly ideological agenda,” Smith noted that “there is nothing sacrosanct
about having nine [J]ustices on the Supreme Court,” and that “[i]t requires only
a majority vote in both houses to add a [J]ustice or two.”68 Smith further
observed that, throughout history, “the method most frequently employed to
bring the [C]ourt to heel has been increasing or decreasing its membership.”69
Yet the most recent example he could give of a change in the size of the Court
was from the 1860s. He also mentioned Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 Courtpacking proposal, which would have allowed one Justice to be added to the
Court, up to a total membership of fifteen, for each Justice over the age of
seventy who had served at least ten years and who did not retire within six
months of his seventieth birthday.70 But that proposal encountered substantial
opposition, including within FDR’s own political party, and was never adopted.
In evaluating arguments like Smith’s, it is worth reflecting on the materials
67. Jean Edward Smith, Opinion, Stacking the Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/07/26/opinion/26smith.html?_r 0 [https://perma.cc/X2VH-YA4N]; see also Ian Millhiser,
In Defense of Court-Packing, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2015/02/fdr_court_packing_plan_obama_and_roosevelt_s_supreme_court_standoffs.
html [https://perma.cc/64V4-2ZKB] (contending that the Roberts Court has been “arbitrarily ignoring
both the text of the law and their own previous decisions in service of a political agenda” and opining
that “[a] future president, . . . could confront a dilemma that no president has faced since Roosevelt”).
68. Smith, supra note 67.
69. Id.
70. See id.; see also PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION TO REORGANIZE JUDICIAL
BRANCH, H.R. Doc. No. 75-142 (1937).
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that one should consider to assess the constitutionality of a plan to pack the
Court. Almost everyone would agree that the constitutional text should be
consulted. There is little in the text, however, that is directly on point. Article III
specifies the existence of “one supreme Court” and provides that “[t]he Judges”
on the Court “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,”71 which perhaps
implies that the Court must consist of more than one Justice. Article III also
describes the scope of the Court’s original jurisdiction and states that in all other
cases the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make,”72 thus giving Congress
some control over the cases that the Court can or must hear but not necessarily
the size of the Court. Article II provides that presidents shall nominate federal
judges and appoint them with the advice and consent of the Senate,73 which
does not appear to speak to the permissibility of Court-packing. Likewise,
Article I includes among Congress’s Section 8 powers the authority “[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”74 but it does not mention
any power concerning the composition of the Court.
To be sure, Article I, Section 8, also gives Congress the power “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States,”75 including the Judicial Branch. This clause provides textual support for
congressional authority to set the size of the Court by statute. But the Necessary
and Proper Clause does not identify when, if ever, the exercise of this authority
would exceed what is “necessary and proper.”
As noted in Part I, where the constitutional text is not perceived to speak
clearly and comprehensively to a question, many interpreters would turn to
historical practice, especially on issues relating to the separation of powers.76
An examination of such practice regarding the issue of Court-packing would
show, as Smith emphasized in his op-ed, that Congress has at times altered the
size of the Court, and that it sometimes has done so in highly politicized
circumstances. It would not show, however, that Congress has engaged in
Court-packing akin to what FDR attempted in 1937—that is, altering the size of
the Court as a result of disagreement with Supreme Court decisions. Moreover,
although the practice might show that Congress sometimes altered the size of
the Court in order to affect its general decision making going forward, even that
practice is now a century and a half old.

71. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
72. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
73. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
74. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
75. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
76. Some interpreters would also make originalist inquiries. This Article does not because its
concerns lie elsewhere and because it is unlikely that the original meaning of the Constitution, even if
knowable, would settle the permissibility of a plan to pack the Court.
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In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress provided that the Court would have
six Justices.77 This number was related to the circuit court system established by
the Act: In addition to creating thirteen district courts, the Act created three
judicial circuits, and it directed that these circuits were to hold two sessions per
year and would be staffed by two Supreme Court Justices and one district court
judge.78 (To reduce the burden of circuit-riding, Congress changed the law in
1793 to require that only one Supreme Court Justice would have to sit with a
district court judge in a given circuit session, which meant that each Justice
would have to ride circuit only once per year.79) Except for a brief interruption
in 1801, discussed immediately below, the close connection between the size of
the Court and the structure of the circuit court system persisted until 1869,
which is also the last time that Congress altered the size of the Court.80
In 1801, the lame-duck Federalist Congress directed that upon the next
vacancy on the Court, its size would be reduced to five, apparently to deny
incoming President Thomas Jefferson an appointment.81 Congress also provided
in that statute for separate staffing of the circuit courts.82 The incoming
Democratic-Republican Congress, however, quickly restored the number to six
(before there was a vacancy) and reestablished the connection between the size
of the Court and the circuit court system.83 In 1807, Congress established a
seventh judicial circuit consisting of the new states Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee, and, as contemplated by the statutory scheme, increased the size of
the Court to seven, giving Jefferson another appointment.84
In 1837, when the Democrats finally controlled both political branches,
Congress reorganized the judiciary, creating nine judicial circuits and increasing
the size of the Court to nine.85 Because a majority of the resulting circuits were
composed entirely of slave states, and because of the convention of having one
Justice reside in each circuit, those changes had the effect of ensuring that a
majority of Justices resided in slave states, a pattern that continued throughout
the rest of the antebellum period.86
During the Civil War, a Republican Congress added another judicial circuit to
accommodate the admission of California into the Union and increased the
number of Justices to ten,87 giving Republican President Abraham Lincoln

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
Id. § 4.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333.
See JOHN V. ORTH, HOW MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? 5 (2006).
See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89.
Id. § 7.
See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 34 (1927).
85. See Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176.
86. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM,
STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 195 (2013).
87. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794.

272

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:255

another appointment.88 After Lincoln was assassinated and Andrew Johnson
became President, Congress decreased the size of the Court to seven, arguably
in an effort to block Johnson, a Democrat who sympathized with the South,
from making appointments.89 Relations between Congress and Johnson were so
fraught that the House of Representatives subsequently impeached Johnson,
although he was not convicted in the Senate. After Ulysses Grant was elected,
Congress passed the 1869 Judiciary Act, which increased the number of Justices
back to nine (which matched the number of circuits at that time), a number that
has since remained unchanged.90
This last change in the size of the Court, along with Justice Grier’s subsequent retirement, gave Grant two new appointments. It is sometimes said that
Grant used those appointments to “pack” the Court because, after the appointments, the Court reversed a controversial decision that Grant opposed. In
Hepburn v. Griswold, the Court had held that the national government was
powerless to issue paper money.91 A year later, after Grant made the new
appointments, the Court overruled Hepburn.92 Importantly, the 1869 Judiciary
Act had been enacted prior to the Hepburn decision and Congress did not
appear to have had that case specifically in mind. Thus, regardless of the extent
to which Grant himself selected Justices for the purpose of overturning Hepburn, a matter of some controversy,93 no previous statute accomplished what
FDR sought to accomplish with his 1937 Court-packing plan.
Even if Congress has never engaged in Court-packing per se, the various
changes in the size of the Court, some of which appeared politically motivated,
might suggest that Congress has extensive authority to alter the size of the Court
not only for considerations relating to judicial efficiency and workload, but also

88. The effect of this change was to ensure that, at the end of the Civil War, seven of the ten Justices
resided in states that had abolished slavery long before the war. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 86, at
254.
89. The point has been disputed. Compare ORTH, supra note 80, at 6 (contending that the reduction
was designed to deny Johnson appointments), with Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864–1888: Part One, in VI THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1, 166–70 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) (documenting that Chief Justice Chase had
proposed the reduction in an effort to persuade Congress to increase the Justices’ salaries). Cf. GEYH,
supra note 3, at 68–69 (concluding that “deliberation preceding adoption of the 1866 amendment to
reduce the size of the Supreme Court from ten to seven was so truncated that no conclusive inferences
can be drawn as to Congress’s underlying motivations”). The actual number of Justices did not fall
below eight before Congress restored the number of seats to nine in the 1869 Judiciary Act after
Johnson had left office. See ORTH, supra note 80, at 7.
90. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. For the current version, see 28 U.S.C. § 1 (“The
Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight
associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”).
91. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 604 (1869), overruled by Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
92. See Knox, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457.
93. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s
Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 43 (2002) (describing the controversy).
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for the purpose of changing its ideological composition.94 An initial question,
however, is how broadly to understand the historical examples.95 The past
changes to the size of the Court each involved particular circumstances, motivations, and results, and it is not clear to what extent they should serve as
precedent in other contexts. For example, as noted, Congress has never altered
the Court’s size because of disagreement with specific Court decisions.
Another question is whether some examples might actually constitute “negative non-judicial precedent” akin to infamous judicial decisions like Plessy v.
Ferguson,96 Lochner v. New York,97 and Korematsu v. United States.98 Historical practice, like judicial decisions, can sometimes create negative precedent—
that is, precedent about what not to repeat rather than what is constitutionally
permissible. Just as certain infamous judicial decisions have come to be regarded as “anticanonical,”99 intrusions on the separation of powers—including
intrusions on judicial authority—might come to stand for what should not be
repeated.
There are also issues relating to the timing of the practice. For example, does
relatively early practice settle or “liquidate” the meaning of the Constitution for
all time, or is later practice also relevant?100 And what should one make of the
fact that Congress has not altered the size of the Court for almost 150 years,
despite many protracted controversies about Supreme Court decisions, including Brown v. Board of Education101 and Roe v. Wade?102
Finally, one would need to consider the precedential significance of FDR’s
failed Court-packing plan. Does the fact that it was seriously contemplated
confirm Congress’s authority to pack the Court? Or does the resounding defeat
of the plan, notwithstanding FDR’s broad national popularity and the Democratic Party’s unprecedented degree of control of Congress, suggest the impermissibility of Court-packing?
The balance of this Part examines the debate over FDR’s plan in light of the
above historical and methodological questions. The objective is not to resolve
94. See, e.g., WOODBURN, supra note 62, at 335 (“The reversal of the Supreme Court’s decision in the
legal-tender cases revealed the weak point in its organization. It is within the power of Congress and the
President to ‘pack’ the Court, if they have a mind to do so. The number of the Court can be increased by
act of Congress from nine to fifteen, or to any other convenient number.”).
95. Cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 424 (“Any practice- or precedent-based approach
naturally must confront questions about how to specify the scope of the past practice or precedent.”).
96. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
98. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243, 245 (1998); Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-Viewing History: The Use of the Past as
Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237, 238 (1998).
99. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
100. See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[P]ractice and acquiescence
under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords
an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”). On potential differences between
liquidation and gloss, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 19, at 29–41.
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

274

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:255

the constitutionality of Court-packing but to better understand the nature of the
arguments that were made in 1937 and how they fit within the landscape of U.S.
constitutional law.
B. THE DEBATE OVER FDR’S PLAN

FDR’s Court-packing plan was both defended and criticized based upon
assessments of historical practice. Within the executive branch, it was thought
that, of the possible approaches to addressing the Court’s resistance to the New
Deal (including Court-stripping, which was rejected as too constitutionally
problematic), Court-packing was “the only [option] which is certainly constitutional” because “Congress has on numerous occasions changed the membership
of the Court.”103 Similarly, in what was probably the most able defense of the
plan, Robert Jackson—the Assistant Attorney General at the time—reasoned
that “[l]egislation creating or abolishing vacancies in the Court is authorized by
the Constitution and validated by historical practice as a method of bringing the
elective and nonelective branches of the Government back into a proper coordination.”104 Jackson discussed “six instances” in which Congress had exercised
this authority, and he concluded that “[w]hen immediate and effective action has
been necessary, the method which the President now proposes has been used
throughout our constitutional history.”105
By contrast, in recommending rejection of the plan, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, in its long-awaited and widely circulated report,106 characterized
the plan as “an invasion of judicial power such as has never before been
attempted in this country,” and argued that no historical example cited in
support of the proposal was in fact supportive.107 The closest example, the
Committee reasoned, was the 1866 law passed by the Reconstruction Congress
disallowing new appointments to the Court until its membership had been
reduced from ten to seven. “[W]hatever the motive,” the Committee wrote, “a

103. Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner, Dep’t of Justice, to the Solicitor Gen. 55, 57 (Dec. 10,
1936) [hereinafter Gardner Memorandum] (on file with the authors).
104. Reorganization of the Fed. Judiciary: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.
40 (1937) [hereinafter Hearings].
105. Id. at 41; see also Stephen R. Alton, Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: The Role of Robert H.
Jackson in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Battle with the Supreme Court, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 577
(1997) (noting that “Jackson’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee represented the most
effective advocacy of the administration’s position”).
106. See William E. Leuchtenburg, Comment, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second
Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 675–76 (“The Government Printing Office soon found that it had a
runaway best seller. Thirty thousand pamphlets were sold to the public in less than a month while
Congressmen gobbled up another seventy thousand for free distribution.”).
107. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 11
(1937) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. In his Senate testimony, Professor Erwin Griswold similarly
explained why the historical practice invoked in support of the Court-packing plan was distinguishable.
See Hearings, supra note 104, at 761–64. Among other things, he contended that, in the prior instances,
“it cannot be shown that the dominant purpose in increasing the size of the Court was ever the desire to
influence or control the results of its decisions.” Id. at 763.
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reduction of members at the instance of the bitterest majority that ever held
sway in Congress to prevent a President from influencing the Court is scarcely a
precedent for the expansion of the Court now.”108 The Committee thus deemed
past examples distinguishable or negative precedent, as did other critics of the
plan.109
The Committee also argued that, by relying so heavily on historical practice,
the proponents of the Court-packing plan “show how important precedents are
and prove that we should now refrain from any action that would seem to
establish one which could be followed hereafter whenever a Congress and an
executive should become dissatisfied with the decisions of the Supreme
Court.”110 In rejecting the plan, the Committee saw itself as “set[ting] a salutary
precedent that will never be violated.”111
Notably, the Committee expressly lodged constitutional objections. It declared that the plan was “contrary to the spirit of the Constitution” and that
“[u]nder the form of the Constitution it seeks to do that which is unconstitutional.”112 The Committee expanded upon the “constitutional impropriety” of
the bill by describing how the American constitutional system functions, and is
supposed to function, in practice:
For the protection of the people, for the preservation of the rights of the
individual, for the maintenance of the liberties of minorities, for maintaining
the checks and balances of our dual system, the three branches of the
Government were so constituted that the independent expression of honest
difference of opinion could never be restrained in the people’s servants and no
one branch could overawe or subjugate the others. That is the American
system.113

“Constitutionally,” the Committee concluded, “the bill can have no sanction.”114
It “is in violation of the organic law.”115

108. SENATE REPORT, supra note 107, at 13.
109. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 104, at 1016 (testimony of New York University Law School
Dean Frank H. Sommer) (“Precedents are of bad and good repute. The repute of this [1866 example] is
evil.”).
110. SENATE REPORT, supra note 107, at 14.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 9, 23. Others also arguably voiced constitutional concerns, although whether they
understood themselves as making a legal argument is unclear. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 104, at
767 (testimony of Erwin Griswold) (“Despite the assertion that the bill raises no constitutional problem,
it is obvious that it presents the deepest sort of constitutional issue, an issue of a system of government.
Our system would in fact be changed if this bill goes through.”).
113. SENATE REPORT, supra note 107, at 8.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id.
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C. HISTORICAL GLOSS AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

As just shown, some criticisms of FDR’s Court-packing plan were based
directly on historical practice, and some objections to the plan were framed in
constitutional terms, despite the lack of a textual hook in the Constitution. At
times, as in the above quotation from the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
constitutional claims involved appeals to the “spirit” of the Constitution.116
Such appeals were also made by a number of prominent witnesses in the Senate
hearings. For example, New York University Law School Dean Frank Sommer
testified that packing the Court for the purpose of altering its decisions “while
conforming to the letter, would violate the spirit of the Constitution.”117 Thus,
while appeals to the spirit of the Constitution will sometimes reflect claims
based on constitutional conventions, they will also sometimes involve appeals
to constitutional law.
Michael Dorf views the need that participants in the 1937 debate felt to
distinguish the Constitution’s spirit from its form as evidence that the constitutional text crowds out the articulation of constitutional claims based on practice.118 One can, however, also read the Judiciary Committee and some of the
witnesses before it as invoking the constitutional structure, which would potentially operate as binding law.119 Such a reading is especially plausible because,
as flagged above, the Committee invoked structural concerns by emphasizing
the proper functioning of the constitutional system. For example, one frequently
expressed concern was that Court-packing would excessively compromise judicial independence and thereby undermine the constitutional system of checks
and balances, as well as judicial protection of civil liberties.120 To invoke the
spirit of the Constitution or some other form of law is to invoke its purpose.121

116. In its report, the Committee referred to the “spirit” of the Constitution numerous times. Id. at 3,
9, 15, 16.
117. Hearings, supra note 104, at 1011; see also id. at 1014 (contending that the Court-packing bill
“violates the spirit of the Constitution”). Some witnesses, by contrast, argued that Court-packing would
not contravene either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 231 (testimony of
Northwestern University Law School Dean Leon Green).
118. See Dorf, supra note 41, at 81.
119. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 104, at 853 (contending that “the present proposal is contrary to
the fundamental principle of the separation of powers”). A representative of the American Bar
Association, in explaining the Association’s opposition to Court-packing, similarly linked the “spirit” of
the Constitution to the constitutional structure. Id. at 1461 (testimony of Sylvester C. Smith) (“It is not
the mere letter of the Constitution which is important; it is the spirit of the Constitution. Its spirit
essentially demands the division of the powers of government into three separate branches; that
the judicial power be exercised wholly uninfluenced and uncontrolled by any other branch of the
Government.”).
120. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 107, at 8, 14–15, 19–23 (stressing the relationship between
judicial independence and protection of individual rights); see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 222 (2009) (“This evolving image of the Court as protector of civil liberties posed a
serious challenge to Roosevelt’s plan, and his administration struggled to deal with the issue.”).
121. A famous, controversial example in the field of statutory interpretation is Holy Trinity Church v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
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Accordingly, to invoke the spirit of the Constitution is to invoke the purpose of
the Constitution as a whole, or of some important part of it. When relied upon to
support a claim of constitutionality or unconstitutionality, this can be understood as structural reasoning.122
In contrast to this potential structural account, Akhil Amar voices the more
conventional view that Congress possesses broad authority to change the size of
the Court. In his book, America’s Unwritten Constitution, Amar contends that
Congress should prevail as a constitutional matter not only if it has “a sincere
good-government reason for altering the Court’s size,” but “[e]ven if, in a given
instance of resizing the Court, Congress was retaliating against what it perceived as Court abuses—say, a string of dubious rulings and judicial overreaches.”123 Amar so concludes for a combination of originalist, historical, and
textual reasons. First, he believes that “[a] strong case can be made that the
written Constitution was designed precisely to allow Congress to rein in or
resize a Court that Congress believes has acted improperly.”124 Second, he
emphasizes the nineteenth century practice of altering the size of the Court,
discussed above, as well as the fact that the rejection of FDR’s Court-packing
plan in 1937 was not the result of an express settlement between the political
branches on a matter of constitutional principle.125 Third, Amar argues that
although “customary practice [can] attach[] to and help[] define a specific
constitutional word or phrase, . . . the familiar number nine has no . . . clause to
which it can comfortably adhere. Nor does the Constitution give the decision
about Court size to the Court itself and thereby create a strong incentive
structure that might limit the imaginable options.”126
This Article takes no position on whether Amar is ultimately right. The point,
rather, is that the normative picture becomes more complex when, like the
participants in the 1937 debate, one also takes historical gloss into account.
Pursuant to the gloss methodology, the last century and a half of practice—
during which time there has been no alteration to the size of the Court—and all
of American history—during which time Court-packing of the sort attempted by
FDR has never occurred—can be tied to structural reasoning and does not
require tethering to a particular word or phrase in the constitutional text
(although, to reiterate, the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause is
available). To be sure, the gloss and structural modalities of interpretation do
not suggest that “[t]he long-standing tradition of a Supreme Court with exactly
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its
makers.”).
122. For discussions of structural reasoning in constitutional law, see BALKIN, supra note 30, at 142,
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), and PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74–92 (1982).
123. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE
LIVE BY 354–55 (2012).
124. Id. at 355.
125. Id. at 354–55.
126. Id. at 356.
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nine seats” is unalterable, but these modalities do provide grounds for questioning the conclusion of Amar and others that the tradition is “ultimately entrusted
to other branches to maintain or modify as they see fit.”127 Furthermore, Amar
moves too quickly in suggesting that the failure of FDR’s Court-packing plan
was an instance in which Congress declined to adopt a particular policy
proposal.128 As just shown, constitutional concerns played a prominent role in
the Court-packing debate.
D. CONVENTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Although not using the term, Michael Dorf has suggested that the norm
against Court-packing may be a constitutional convention. He stresses the
existence of a norm against Court-packing that constrains the political branches,
but he doubts that it has the status of constitutional law. “If, say, Congress were
to increase the size of the Supreme Court to eleven Justices,” he states, “neither
the Court itself, nor any member of Congress, could plausibly claim that in so
doing it was acting unconstitutionally.”129 Based on both the constitutional text
and the nineteenth century practice, he adds, “we have excellent textual and
historical reasons to think that the Constitution poses no obstacle.”130 But Dorf
also submits that we “have very good reasons to think that Court packing is
something that Congress and the President just cannot do.”131 He reasons that it
is difficult for the norm against Court-packing to have legal status because the
written-ness of the Constitution tends to crowd out practice-based norms of
constitutional law that are not tethered to the text, and he contends that “there is
no readily available [textual] hook” prohibiting Court-packing.132
This Article agrees that governmental conduct may be impermissible—
because it violates a constitutional convention—even though it is not unconstitutional or subject to judicial review. For example, even if Americans are not
constitutionally entitled to vote directly for the President,133 it would still
widely be perceived as a breach of constitutional morality for state legislatures
to bypass the voters and name state electors. Dorf may also be right that it is
difficult to make constitutional claims in the U.S. legal tradition that are based
only on practice, although it is worth reiterating that some constitutional
criticisms of FDR’s Court-packing plan were based on historical practice.
The constitutional text, however, appears to have less of a crowding effect on
practice-based constitutional norms than Dorf posits. As discussed above, the
1937 debate in the Senate over Court-packing shows that such norms can be

127. Id.
128. See id. at 354.
129. Dorf, supra note 41, at 79.
130. Id. at 74.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 75.
133. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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incorporated in claims about the constitutional structure, especially when there
is no specific text contradicting the practice.134 Practice-based norms can also
be incorporated in claims emanating from what today would be called popular
constitutionalism, which may not be tethered to the text, or which may be
tethered to unconventional text, such as the Preamble. Some objections to
FDR’s plan were framed in such terms. Yale Law School Professor Edwin
Borchard sounded this theme in his testimony before the Senate, arguing that,
although “[i]n a narrow sense [the Court-packing plan] is legal and it is within
the letter of the Constitution. In a broader sense, the Webster or English sense, it
is unconstitutional, because in the minds of many it is calculated to make the
Supreme Court subservient to the Executive.”135 That popular constitutionalist
objections need not be tied to the text, or even to an accurate account of history,
is delightfully captured by an elderly woman’s complaint about FDR’s plan that
“[i]f nine judges were enough for George Washington, they should be enough
for President Roosevelt.”136 To correct her account of history is to miss the
deeper point that she was conveying.
What may be most significant about objections to FDR’s Court-packing plan
is their ambiguity. Reading the Senate Hearing Transcript and Report, it is not
always clear whether the objection was that Court-packing would be normatively improper but legally permissible, or would be normatively improper and
legally impermissible. References to the “spirit” of the Constitution were at
times similarly ambiguous. Because these remarks were made in the Senate, as
opposed to in a court, there was less need to be precise about the distinction.
Relatedly, conceptions of “the Constitution” can be broader outside the courts
than in an argument before a court. This is important to bear in mind in
separation of powers law, because much of it is enforced by nonjudicial
actors.137
A number of prominent critics of FDR’s Court-packing plan seemed to
straddle the line between constitutional conventions and constitutional law. For
example, in his Senate testimony, Raymond Moley—a professor of public law

134. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 45, at 1230 n.77; supra Section II.C; see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise
question, the answer to the [petitioners’] challenge must be sought in historical understanding and
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”).
135. Hearings, supra note 104, at 827.
136. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 139 (1995).
137. Cf. Grove, supra note 3, at 1836 (“The political branches may approach the process of
constitutional interpretation in a way that differs considerably from what a judge deems appropriate.”).
Nevertheless, it is easy to overstate differences between constitutional reasoning by judicial and
nonjudicial actors. Judges, especially Justices, often do not provide clear guidance; they may not accord
stare decisis substantial weight; and they may credit nonlegal considerations, raising questions about
the purity of their motives. Meanwhile, government officials, like judges, often reason from precedent
and other interpretive modalities, and it may be difficult for judges to improve upon certain relatively
unmanageable standards that government officials articulate. See, e.g., infra Section III.C.2 (discussing
an OLC opinion that relied on Henry Hart’s famous Dialogue).
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at Columbia University and an editor at Newsweek magazine—contended that
there was now a “custom of the Constitution” against Court-packing, which he
contended was “as binding upon public officials as a written provision of the
Constitution itself.”138 This statement might suggest that he was making a claim
about constitutional law. But he proceeded to give examples of other such
constitutional customs, some of which were probably conventional rather than
legal: the obligation of presidential electors to cast their votes in accordance
with the election returns; the norm against presidents serving more than two
terms; and the “custom of the British Constitution that the King shall give effect
to the will of Parliament.”139
Harvard Law School Professor Erwin Griswold, in his Senate testimony, also
seemed to tack back and forth between constitutional law and constitutional
conventions. Noting that “arguments . . . could be made in support of the proposition that [the Court-packing plan] is unconstitutional,” Griswold contended
that “[t]he constitutionality of the present proposal is not the real issue.”140
Emphasizing that “not all things that are constitutional are things that should be
done,” Griswold observed that “[i]t would be constitutional for Congress to
impeach a President on purely political grounds,” but that “[t]he verdict of
history is that it is not good government to try it.”141 Similarly, he noted that
“[i]t would be constitutional for a President to seek a third term,” but that “[o]ur
traditions, of long standing, are against it on the ground of wisdom, not of
power.”142
E. THE ROLE OF POLITICS

To say that a purported constitutional or conventional norm against Courtpacking might have played an important role in the defeat of FDR’s plan does
not mean that it did. The fact that many actors in the debate talked in legal or
conventional terms is suggestive, but not dispositive, because it might have
been cheap talk masking other motivations or otherwise might have been
immaterial to the outcome.
Using the defeat of FDR’s plan as an example, Adrian Vermeule contends
that the very political conditions that are necessary to attempt controversial
judicial reform are also the conditions that make such reform difficult.143
Among other things, Vermeule suggests that a political party with a narrow
majority is unlikely to have enough cohesion to overcome barriers in the

138. Hearings, supra note 104, at 546.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 767.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also id. at 1011 (testimony of N.Y.U. School of Law Dean Frank Sommer) (“Though
the exercise by Congress of this power for a purpose or end other than that for which the power was left
with Congress would constitute an abuse of power, it could not be successfully challenged in the
Supreme Court.”).
143. See Vermeule, Political Constraints, supra note 9, at 1154.
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legislative process and that a party with a large majority, such as the Democrats
under FDR, is likely to trigger public resistance because of fears about too
much power residing in too few hands.144
Vermeule describes the latter possibility as a purely political account. In
doing so, he appears to pass over how participants in the Court-packing debate
perceived interconnections among law, conventions, and politics. For example,
he notes that many opponents of FDR’s plan gave weight to the fact that there
had been nine Justices on the Court since the 1860s, an example of the
“normative power of the factual.”145 “Such longstanding rules or invented
traditions, whose dubious origin is usually lost in the mists of time,” Vermeule
explains, “often come to seem normatively significant.”146 But he does not
show that people attribute such weight to historical practice only when they
have political concerns about party domination. Nor does he show that this
consideration is merely political, which seems especially unlikely when the
concerns are expressed by members of the dominant party. Recall that FDR was
re-elected overwhelmingly in 1936—a pivotal election in American history—
yet his Court-packing plan was opposed vigorously by many members of his
own party.147
Vermeule also submits that FDR was constrained in how he attempted to sell
the plan. Correctly identifying the “widespread perception that the courtpacking plan was a disingenuous proposal,” Vermeule writes that FDR could
emphasize judicial workload and efficiency, which risked seeming disingenuous
(because it was), or he could more candidly advocate the need to change the
composition of the obstructionist Court, which risked intensifying the opposition and so would not have improved his chances of success.148 “Political actors
are constrained to offer a public-regarding justification for reform,” Vermeule
suggests, “one that does not map too obviously onto their ideological views or
partisan interests.”149
FDR did indeed face a dilemma, but there is more to say about why FDR was
reluctant to present a more candid explanation of the Court-packing plan.
Vermeule suggests that such an explanation would have seemed “partisan.”150
Perhaps, but it is not clear why that would have counted against it. The
Democratic Party, although far from homogenous and therefore potentially
vulnerable to splintering, was dominant to an extent that seems difficult to
imagine today: it held more than three-fourths of the seats in the House and
144. See id. at 1161–62.
145. Id. at 1162 (quoting LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 136, at 137–42).
146. Id. at 1162–63.
147. For example, seven of the ten Senators who signed the adverse report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee were prominent Democrats. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 136, at 146. Moreover, Senator
Burton Wheeler of Montana, a progressive Democrat, played a leading role in opposing the plan. See
id. at 137, 140.
148. See Vermeule, Political Constraints, supra note 9, at 1163.
149. Id. at 1164.
150. See id.
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seventy-five of the Senate’s ninety-six seats.151 Moreover, it was already enacting numerous statutes that could similarly be described as partisan. The debates
recounted above suggest a more likely reason for FDR’s perception of constraint: the candid explanation would have triggered powerful separation of
powers concerns. When considered that way, the story becomes less clearly one
that is simply about politics. Opposition to Court-packing stemmed in part from
normative commitments that are difficult to reduce to politics.152
Internal debates within FDR’s administration provide additional support for
the above account of the constraints that FDR perceived. Members of his
administration debated whether to give the disingenuous explanation or the
candid explanation for Court-packing, with Robert Jackson and others pushing
for candor.153 Eventually, FDR came around to that position, and he became
much more forthright about the justifications for the Court-packing plan—most
famously in a “fireside chat” in March 1937.154 Jackson himself gave similar
justifications in his Senate testimony.155 But, sure enough, those explanations—
which everyone had already perceived anyway—generated expressions of intense concern about judicial independence.156 It is also noteworthy that many
objections to the plan in and out of Congress were not about whether action
should be taken to rein in the Court, but about how to do so—through a statute
or a constitutional amendment.157 That process concern does not seem purely
political.
151. See U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
3–130 (2d. ed. 1937).
152. Cf. JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 29 (Da Capo Press 1973) (1938) (“[FDR
and his Attorney General] realized that [Court-packing] offended against what they privately called a
‘taboo,’ but they believed that the taboo had been greatly weakened by the Court’s own behavior.”);
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 136, at 118–19 (“Both the Attorney General and the President had been
attracted to ‘Court-packing’ for a long time, but they recognized that the proposition violated a taboo
and that some principle would have to be found to legitimate it.”).
153. MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURTPACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 331 (2002).
154. See id. at 351–52. In the speech, FDR contended that his plan will “save our Constitution from
hardening of the [judicial] arteries,” and he denied that he would appoint “spineless puppets.” Id. at
355.
155. See id. at 342.
156. See id. at 303 (noting that “[t]he proposal was denounced for perverting the Constitution,
undermining judicial integrity, and destroying judicial independence”). Critics of the plan invoked the
specter of developments in Europe, and publicly worried that the United States might be heading down
the path towards dictatorship. See, e.g., JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE
SUPREME COURT 303 (2010).
157. See MCKENNA, supra note 153, at 303–04 (quoting letters to Congress making this point); see
also Hearings, supra note 104, at 719–20 (testimony of Dean of Columbia Law School Young B.
Smith) (arguing that the only proper approach for addressing the Supreme Court’s resistance to the New
Deal was “submitting the question to the people” through a proposed constitutional amendment);
SENATE REPORT, supra note 107, at 7, 10 (emphasizing that amendment is “the course defined by the
framers of the Constitution” and “the rule laid down by the Constitution itself”); Vermeule, Political
Constraints, supra note 9, at 1170–71 (noting that FDR’s Court-packing plan “was also opposed by
some, such as Senator George Norris, who genuinely favored the substance of the proposal but who
also genuinely thought that constitutional amendment was the proper path”).
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Of course, factors other than constitutional or convention-based objections to
Court-packing contributed to the defeat of FDR’s plan. Relishing surprise, FDR
had kept Congress, most of his Cabinet, and the public in the dark about the
plan until it was announced—a move that generated backlash. As noted above,
FDR also initially tried to sell the plan with justifications that were perceived to
be disingenuous.158 Those justifications were also undermined when Chief
Justice Hughes sent a letter to the Senate carefully rebutting FDR’s claim that
the Court was behind in its work and also explaining that enlarging the Court
would decrease its efficiency.159 The case for the plan was further undercut by
the purported “switch in time” of Justice Owen Roberts on the constitutionality
of New Deal legislation and by the retirement of Justice Van Devanter.160 To
add insult to injury, FDR’s remaining chance to get a revised Court-packing bill
through Congress evaporated when the chief spokesperson for the bill in the
Senate, Joe Robinson, died unexpectedly.161
The point is not to deny the importance of those factors, some of which—
such as the belief that the Court would be developing a more defensible
jurisprudence going forward, thereby making packing less justified—could
fairly be described as legal. The suggestion, rather, is that gloss-based or
convention-based objections to Court-packing also played a meaningful role in
defeating the plan, even if those legal or conventional concerns were defeasible
and would have been overcome under a certain set of facts.162 It is easier to see
the ways in which participants in the Court-packing debate perceived a role for
law or conventions when one considers the ways in which historical practice
can inform normative understandings.163
158. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 136, at 133–34.
159. See MCKENNA, supra note 153, at 377 (quoting Robert Jackson as saying that Hughes’ letter
“pretty much turned the tide” against FDR’s proposal). But see Richard D. Friedman, Chief Justice
Hughes’ Letter on Court-Packing, 22 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 76, 85 (1997) (concluding that the letter “did not
have a very profound effect”).
160. See MCKENNA, supra note 153, at 435–36, 453–57; see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Public
Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1149
(1987) (concluding, based on polling data, that “[t]wo crucial events—Jones and Laughlin Steel and
Justice Van Devanter’s resignation—spelled doom for FDR’s bill”).
161. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 136, at 152.
162. Concluding that FDR’s plan raised constitutional or conventional concerns does not answer
whether those concerns would have prevailed if events had unfolded differently—for example, if the
Court had continued to strike down New Deal legislation. Compare 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 335 (1998) (suggesting that if the Court had remained oppositional “the
President could have won the battle for court-packing”), with BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 25 (1998) (deeming it “doubtful that
even a compromise bill could survive both a Senate filibuster and the House Judiciary Committee”).
163. During his long tenure in office, FDR was able to appoint eight Justices to the Court, all
committed New Dealers, using the regular appointments process. It may reasonably be asked why that
sort of ideological influence on the Court is not perceived as violating a legal or conventional norm akin
to the one invoked in 1937. One possible answer is that, unlike the direct control over the Court
entailed by changing the number of Justices, politicians do not control when a vacancy occurs. In
addition, there may be virtues to slowing down the process by which politicians affect the ideological
orientation of the Court. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
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F. CODA: A PROPOSED COURT-PROTECTING AMENDMENT

Beginning in 1946, and with the events of 1937 in mind, leaders of the
American bar mounted a decade-long campaign, now mostly forgotten, to
protect the Supreme Court’s independence by means of a constitutional amendment.164 After earning the support of the New York City Bar Association, the
American Bar Association, and such legal luminaries as retired Justice Owen
Roberts (the alleged switcher in time in 1937165), the campaign persuaded
Senator John Marshall Butler of Maryland, a conservative Republican who sat
on the Judiciary Committee, to propose a constitutional amendment. In substantial accordance with the bar proposals, Butler’s amendment would have set the
size of the Court at nine, ensured the appellate jurisdiction of the Court for all
constitutional questions, and required the Justices to retire at the age of seventyfive.166 Butler introduced the proposal “to forestall future efforts by a President
or a Congress seeking to nullify or impair the power of the judicial branch of
the Government.”167 He urged that “[t]here are loopholes in the strict letter of
the Constitution as it now reads through which such a thrust might be made.”168
Butler’s proposal received nothing but praise at a hearing held by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.169 The full Judiciary Committee

Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1082 (2001) (emphasizing that “cumulative acts of partisan entrenchment” in the courts, through judicial appointments, can produce “constitutional change . . . quickly or
slowly, depending on how the forces of politics operate”).
164. The campaign was initiated by Edwin Falk of the New York City Bar Association. See Edwin
A. Falk, In Time of Peace Prepare for War, 1 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 245, 250–54 (1946). For an
account of the campaign, albeit one that focuses on the effort to impose a mandatory retirement age for
Justices, see David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for
a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1028–43 (2000). For first-hand accounts, see Edwin A.
Falk, Letter to the Editor, Integrity of Supreme Court: Background Given on Studies Made to Reinforce
Its Inviolability, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1954, at 30, and Leonard D. Adkins, Protecting Supreme Court:
Details Given as to Publicity on Adoption of Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1954, at 14.
165. See Owen J. Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court’s Independence, 35
A.B.A. J. 1 (1949) (discussing various constitutional amendments that were proposed regarding the
Supreme Court).
166. See 98 CONG. REC. S5084 (daily ed. May 13, 1952) (introducing S.J. Res. 154, 82nd Cong., 2nd
Sess.); 99 CONG. REC. S1106–1108 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1953); 100 CONG. REC. S6256 (daily ed. May 10,
1954). Butler’s proposal also would have prohibited Justices who left the Court from serving as
President or Vice President for five years, but that provision was dropped because it “might be
considered to be a reflection on the Supreme Court or on some of its members.” 100 CONG. REC. S6344
(daily ed. May 11, 1954) (statement of Sen. Butler).
167. 99 CONG. REC. S1106 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1953) (statement of Sen. Butler). Two days later,
Representative Edward Miller of Maryland introduced an identical measure in the House. See 99 CONG.
REC. H1231 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1953) (introducing H.J. Res. 194, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.).
168. 99 CONG. REC. S1106 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1953) (statement of Sen. Butler). Some editorial
boards also referenced “loopholes” in the text of the Constitution. See Editorial, The Size of the
Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1954, at A4 (“[T]here is a loophole . . . by which a complaisant
Congress and a dictatorial executive could change the whole character of the government by a mere
legislative enactment . . . .”); Editorial, Insulating the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, May 14, 1954, at 26
(similar).
169. See Composition and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearing on S.J. Res. 44 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong. (1954). At the hearing, supporters of the amendment included
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added a section requiring the retirement of lower federal court judges at age
seventy-five and unanimously reported the resolution to the full Senate.170 On
the Senate floor, Senator Butler reiterated that he was proposing the amendment
during a period of calm because it was “an excellent opportunity to forestall
future attempts to undermine the integrity and independence of the Supreme
Court.”171 In May 1954, the Senate passed Butler’s proposed resolution by a
vote of 58–19.172 But the proposal received less interest in the House; after a
subcommittee hearing,173 it was ultimately tabled (and thus effectively killed)
by the House Judiciary Committee.174
It is difficult to draw strong inferences from this episode, one way or the
other, concerning the status of any norm against Court-packing. On the one
hand, the episode may illustrate the perceived absence of constitutional constraints on Court-packing, because if such constraints had been thought to exist,
it might seem puzzling why proponents of the proposal would have thought it
necessary to amend the Constitution. On the other hand, some supporters may
have believed that a constitutional prohibition on Court-packing would be
stronger, and thus less likely to be violated, if it was reflected in the text of the
Constitution rather than only in historical practice and structural inferences that
could be dismissed in the future as vague.
In any event, the proposed constitutional amendment was never adopted, and
some opponents of it apparently thought that it was unnecessary because there
was already a sufficient constitutional or conventional norm against Courtpacking in place. For example, Senator Thomas Hennings, a liberal Democrat
from Missouri, believed that the amendment was “wholly unnecessary” because
“an attempt to ‘pack’ the Court . . . would certainly meet with the most vigorous
opposition,” for “in the past such opposition has been substantial, effective, and

retired Justice Roberts, Harrison Tweed (President of the American Law Institute), Albert Jenner
(Chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform), and the aforementioned Edwin Falk.
170. JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMPOSITION AND JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT, S. REP. NO. 83-1091, at 1 (2d Sess. 1954). After discussing past efforts to change the
size of the Court, the Senate Report stated that “[t]his recital of history demonstrates that legislative
manipulation of the Court is not a theoretical proposition unbuttressed by experience.” Id. at 3.
171. 100 CONG. REC. S6256 (daily ed. May 10, 1954) (statement of Sen. Butler). Butler made this
statement when the Court’s decision in Brown I was just a week away, yet no reference to the litigation
appears in the Congressional Record within the context of debate over the proposed amendment.
172. 100 CONG. REC. S6347 (daily ed. May 11, 1954) (recording the vote). An amendment eliminated the prohibition on Justices serving as President or Vice President for a period of five years. See
supra note 166.
173. See Composition and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 and H.J. Res.
194, H.J. Res. 27, and H.J. Res. 91 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong. (1954). The
subcommittee favorably reported the proposal to the full committee.
174. See C. P. Trussell, Court Amendment Tabled in House: Judiciary Group, 11–8, Kills Bid to Fix
Size at 9 and Retire Justices at 75, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1954, at 11.
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decisive.”175 Along similar lines, Professor John O’Reilly of the Boston College
Law School invoked a constitutional convention, writing that “we must proceed
on the assumption that those who hold high office, whether in the White House,
in the Congress, or on the Court, will continue to have and to manifest, on basic
issues, a sense of responsibility and of the proprieties consistent with accepted
American tradition.”176
An additional complication is that the proposed amendment would have gone
beyond disallowing Court-packing because it would have barred any enlargement of the size of the Court, even for reasons of workload. Some opponents of
the proposal expressed concern about this feature.177 A still further complication
is that the proposed amendment contained multiple provisions, and it is not
clear which ones opponents found most problematic and why.178
In part because the debate over Butler’s proposal occurred outside the context
of an actual or proposed effort to change the size of the Court, participants in
the debate were not required to take a firm position on the status of any norm
against Court-packing. The fact that any such norm had not been breached, and
was not facing any imminent danger of breach, also likely contributed to the
defeat of the proposal. Some opponents of the proposal argued, for example,
that the defeat of FDR’s Court-packing plan, notwithstanding all of the political
advantages that he enjoyed, showed that a constitutional amendment was
unnecessary.179
These arguments suggest that the defeat of Butler’s proposal may have been
due in part to a belief that one should run the risk of amending the Constitution
when—and only when—it is deemed necessary to do so because certain normative limits have been transgressed. Three years earlier, the Twenty-Second
Amendment had been ratified, providing in part that “[n]o person shall be

175. 100 CONG. REC. S6341, 6343 (daily ed. May 11, 1954) (statement of Sen. Hennings); see also
High Court Bill Opposed: Hennings Raps Amendment Proposed by Butler, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 4,
1954. at 4.
176. Composition and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 and H.J. Res.
194, H.J. Res. 27, and H.J. Res. 91 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong. 53 (1954)
[hereinafter O’Reilly Letter] (letter from Professor John D. O’Reilly, Jr. to Senator Butler).
177. See, e.g., 100 CONG. REC. S6342 (daily ed. May 11, 1954) (statement of Senator Hennings that
he thought it “entirely conceivable that at some time, some day, we may wish to increase the number
[of Justices] to accommodate a greater workload of the Court”); O’Reilly Letter, supra note 176, at 52
(explaining that although he opposed Court-packing, he also opposed any restriction that might in the
future prevent the Court from “most efficiently” performing its functions).
178. Also contributing to the defeat of the proposal was the decision of the House subcommittee to
reinsert the prohibition on Justices serving as President or Vice President for five years. See REP. OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW REFORM 244 (1954).
179. See, e.g., House Vote Against the Supreme Court Amendment, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 15, 1954, at
12 (“For, said Representative Celler, if Congress beat the court-pack of 1937, could it not be trusted to
handle a similar effort in the future without the need of a constitutional amendment? This argument
gained weight among those who recalled the circumstances in which Mr. Roosevelt had acted in
1937.”). Emmanuel Celler was a Brooklyn Democrat and former chair of the House Judiciary
Committee who had opposed FDR’s Court-packing plan. See Trussell, supra note 174, at 11.
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elected to the office of the President more than twice.”180 That amendment was
adopted only after there had been a breach in practice of the norm against
serving more than two presidential terms. (Rather than signifying that the norm
did not exist, the campaign for an amendment signified that the norm had been
breached.) There was ultimately no such breach with respect to Court-packing.
Indeed, as the next Part documents, the Court-packing episode became a
cautionary precedent that was invoked in the ensuing years in debates over
jurisdiction-stripping.
III. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND COURT-STRIPPING
It is widely agreed that Congress enjoys significant authority to define and
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.181 The constitutional limits on
Congress’s exercise of that authority, however, are deeply contested. In addition, there has been almost no discussion of possible constitutional conventions
that might operate to constrain congressional action. This Part focuses on one
form of jurisdiction-stripping: a congressional restriction on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that reflects a substantive disagreement with how
the Court has decided, or is expected to decide, a constitutional question. This
Article calls the imposition of such a limitation on the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction “Court-stripping.” As discussed below, although academics have
given relatively little attention to the relevance of historical practice to constitutional issues relating to Court-stripping, such practice has featured prominently
in debates between, and within, the political branches.
A. ACADEMIC DEBATES

Participants in academic debates over Court-stripping have emphasized textualist, originalist, structuralist, and doctrinalist arguments in favor of either
plenary congressional control or limited congressional authority. The debate
remains unresolved because the text sends mixed messages, the original understanding is disputed, general structural reasoning turns on contestable visions of
the fundamental role of the Court in the federal system, and the most relevant
Supreme Court decision offers something for everyone.
Article III begins by declaring that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”182 The first clause of
Article III, Section 2, extends the federal judicial power to nine categories of
cases and controversies, including “all Cases . . . arising under” federal law.183
Clause 2 grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in certain cases, and
provides—in what has come to be known as the Exceptions Clause—that “[i]n
180.
181.
182.
183.

U.S. CONST. amend XXII, § 1.
See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 30–33.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
Id. § 2, cl. 1.
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all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.”184
The plain meaning of the Exceptions Clause might be thought to authorize
Court-stripping as an “Exception” to the general rule of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, so long as Congress does not violate some constitutional limit
external to Article III (such as the Habeas Suspension Clause of Article I,
Section 9). “This language,” Paul Bator wrote, “plainly seems to indicate that if
Congress wishes to exclude a certain category of federal constitutional (or
other) litigation from the appellate jurisdiction, it has the authority to do so.”185
Martin Redish also emphasized the plain meaning of the constitutional text,
concluding that “[t]here is . . . no internal method of construing the exceptions
clause to mean anything other than what it says.”186 “On its face,” Gerald
Gunther agreed, “the exceptions clause . . . seems to grant a quite unconfined
power to Congress to withhold from the Court a large number of classes of
cases potentially within its appellate jurisdiction.”187 More recently, Michael
Dorf wrote that, “under the most straightforward reading of the text of Article
III, Congress could . . . eliminate all appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.”188
Bator’s use of the locution “plainly seems” and Gunther’s similar hedge,
however, may reflect a recognition that the semantic meaning of the text may
not be clear. Purely as a linguistic matter, reference to an exception may
presuppose a rule that the exception is not permitted to swallow. If so, the
Exceptions Clause would not authorize Congress to eliminate all of, or perhaps
even most of, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, it may not
be obvious how to reconcile the Exceptions Clause with the language of Article
III, Section 1, which requires the existence of “one supreme Court” and which
requires that it “shall be vested” with “[t]he judicial Power”189—presumably
not some of that power, but all of it. A Court that lacks both original and
appellate jurisdiction to decide a federal question seems neither supreme with
respect to that question nor vested with all of the federal judicial power.190 Note
also that the text requires federal judicial power to be vested in the Supreme
Court “and”—not “or”—in whatever lower federal courts that Congress creates.

184. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
185. Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 1030, 1038 (1982).
186. Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 915 (1982).
187. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 901 (1984).
188. Dorf, supra note 41, at 81. Notably, however, Dorf does not argue that there are no Article III
limits on the scope of the Exceptions Clause. See id. at 81–82.
189. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (emphasis added).
190. For additional discussion of the implications of the vesting language in Article III, see infra text
accompanying notes 381–84.
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More adventurously, the Exceptions Clause might be thought to apply to
questions of “Fact,” not “Law,” as some scholars have argued on textualist and
originalist grounds.191 Or it might be thought to license Congress only to move
cases from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to its original jurisdiction, as other
scholars have argued on similar grounds notwithstanding the contrary holding
of Marbury v. Madison.192 In short, the plain text of Article III does not by itself
resolve the question of the permissibility of Court-stripping.193
Without attempting to canvas here the originalist literature relating to the
Exceptions Clause, it seems fair to say that this literature has not yielded an
interpretive consensus. As a general matter, the Framers did not focus on Article
III to nearly the extent that they focused on other parts of the Constitution. More
specifically, the Exceptions Clause was added by the Committee of Detail, not
the Constitutional Convention itself, and the Committee’s purposes in doing so
remain unknown, in part because the addition triggered no discussion, let alone
debate, on the floor of the Convention.194 To be sure, most modern originalists
would focus not on the intent of the Framers, but on the original semantic
meaning of the Exceptions Clause or of Article III more broadly.195 But
scholarship has not established that the original semantic meaning of the word
“Exceptions” was relatively clear and permitted plenary congressional authority,
or that it was originally understood to imply that there was no point at which an
exception to a rule would eviscerate that rule. Moreover, modern originalists
often consult evidence of original intent as evidence of original meaning, and
the Founders who debated whether the existence of lower federal courts should
be mandatory, permissible, or prohibited all assumed that the Supreme Court
would enjoy jurisdiction to hear appeals from the judgments of state courts on
issues of federal importance.196
Given the apparent under-determinacy of textualist and originalist arguments,
participants in academic debates over Court-stripping have shored up their
positions with general structural argumentation that is often tied loosely to
191. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285–96 (1969). Others disagree. See,
e.g., Bator, supra note 185, at 1040 (“The historical evidence is far from conclusive, but the evidence to
support the proposition that the exceptions clause was to be reserved exclusively to issues of fact is
weak.”); Gunther, supra note 187, at 901 (describing the “facts only” limitation on congressional power
as “at least contrary to the punctuation of the relevant phrase” and as “enjoy[ing] very little academic
support today”).
192. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–75 (1803); see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary
Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1037–38 (2007).
193. For another important textual argument, see James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the
Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1435 & n.10 (2000)
(contending that the grant of power to Congress in Article I to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court” carries with it limitations on Congress’s ability to restrict the Supreme Court’s
supervisory authority over the lower federal courts).
194. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 18, 314.
195. For an overview of the reasons for that change in emphasis over time, see Keith E. Whittington,
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378–82 (2013).
196. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 18–19; Bator, supra note 185, at 1038–39.
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claims about original intent. Herbert Wechsler, reflecting the modest, dispute
resolution model of judicial review of the early editions of the Hart & Wechsler
federal courts casebook, argued in this fashion in defending plenary congressional control:
[T]he plan of the Constitution for the courts . . . was quite simply that the
Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated
differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts,
bound as they are by [the Supremacy Clause].197

Agreeing with Wechsler, Charles Black, the dean of structural constitutional
argumentation, insisted that the authority of Congress to restrict the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction constitutes “the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the
judicial work in a democracy.”198 On that structural vision, the permissibility of
Court-stripping plays a pivotal role in reconciling judicial supremacy with
majoritarian democracy.
By contrast, although Paul Bator agreed with Wechsler and Black that
Court-stripping would be constitutional, he expressed the originalist and structural concern that Court-stripping would contravene the “spirit” of the Constitution because it “would create a system inconsistent with the structure that the
Framers assumed to be appropriate” in the debate over the constitutional status
of lower federal courts.199 According to Bator, “the structure contemplated by
the instrument makes sense—and was thought to make sense—only on the
premise that there would be a federal Supreme Court with the power to
pronounce uniform and authoritative rules of federal law.”200
Henry Hart went further, suggesting the possibility that the Constitution does
not “authoriz[e] exceptions which engulf the rule” of appellate jurisdiction, and
that “the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”201 Leonard Ratner attempted to
render Hart’s “essential role” idea less indeterminate by arguing that “exceptions” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction may not “negate” the Court’s “essential constitutional functions of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of
federal law.”202 Applying that structural standard, Ratner declared the unconstitutionality of “legislation that precludes Supreme Court review in every case
197. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965).
198. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 846 (1975);
see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HOLMES LECTURES 37–38
(1981).
199. Bator, supra note 185, at 1038.
200. Id. at 1039.
201. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953).
202. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201–02 (1960).
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involving a particular subject.”203
As with those differing structural visions, Supreme Court precedent offers
support for both sides of the academic debate. The key case, Ex parte McCardle,
not-coincidentally arose during a period of changes in the size of the Court—
Reconstruction. 204 In McCardle, the Court had to decide the constitutionality of
an 1868 federal statute that repealed a provision enacted the previous year. The
1867 provision had authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from denials of
habeas relief by a federal circuit court. Congress in 1868 acted with the
apparent—albeit not express—purpose of preventing the Court from deciding
the then-pending McCardle case.205 On the merits, the case involved a constitutional challenge to McCardle’s criminal prosecution before a military commission and possibly to the Military Reconstruction Act more generally, which
provided for military rule in the South.206 The Court dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction, concluding that Congress had acted permissibly in 1868
under the “express words” of the Exceptions Clause and that it was “not at
liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.”207 Defenders of plenary
congressional power emphasize these portions of the decision: the Reconstruction Congress anticipated that it would disagree with the Court’s decision, and
the Court upheld congressional authority to prevent it from deciding the case.
Opponents of Court-stripping, however, have not had much difficulty distinguishing McCardle from more recent Court-stripping proposals. The Court in
McCardle pointedly emphasized at the end of its opinion that Congress had left
open a distinct, pre-existing basis for appellate review in habeas cases.208 Mere
months after McCardle, moreover, in Ex parte Yerger, the Court exercised
jurisdiction under that alternate basis.209 Thus, perhaps McCardle is not authority for Court-stripping, which would foreclose all avenues of Supreme Court
review, but is instead authority only for the limited proposition that Congress
may eliminate one avenue of appellate jurisdiction if, but only if, another
avenue remains available.210 Much closer to the present, the Court in Felker v.

203. Id. at 201.
204. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
205. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1790–91
(2008) (arguing that the alleged tension between McCardle and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1872), “dissolves once we appreciate the then-prevailing norms of judicial review,”
according to which “courts could impute impermissible purposes to a statute when ‘the language of the
proviso’ made them clear (as in Klein), but not when the imputation required reference to things beyond
the face of the statute (as in McCardle)” (quoting Klein, 80 U.S. at 145)).
206. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 316.
207. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514.
208. See id. at 515 (“Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in
question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an
error.”).
209. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
210. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at 1078 (“But McCardle would be an easily distinguishable
precedent for a Supreme Court that wanted to distinguish it”). As noted in Section II.B, when
considering options for restraining the Court during the New Deal, Deputy Solicitor General Warner
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Turpin relied upon a similar rationale in upholding a congressional restriction
on Supreme Court review of certain habeas petitions.211 Finally, given the
enormous political pressure under which the Court in McCardle was operating
(discussed further below), the parts of the decision that are emphasized by
defenders of plenary congressional control may actually constitute negative
judicial precedent.212
Participants in the academic debate over Court-stripping have occasionally
referenced potentially relevant historical practices of the political branches.
Legal academics have not tended, however, to emphasize the interpretive
relevance of historical practice as an independent source of constitutional
authority.213 Moreover, few legal scholars seem to have entertained the possibility that a constitutional convention prohibits Court-stripping. When academics
have mentioned congressional practice, they have typically done so in passing
as a relatively minor consideration, and they have tended to emphasize early
practice, especially the Judiciary Act of 1789.214 In addition, academics have
focused generally on whether Congress has made exceptions to the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, not specifically on whether Congress engaged in Courtstripping—that is, made exceptions based upon actual or anticipated substantive
disagreement with Supreme Court decision making. The inattention of academics to the possibility of gloss or conventions is nicely captured by Gunther’s
famous quip that the essential functions idea “confuses the familiar with the
necessary, the desirable with the constitutionally mandated.”215 That statement
has been quoted approvingly far more frequently than it has been critically
analyzed.
B. HISTORICAL PRACTICE

Inspection of the relevant historical practice shows that, although Congress
has long regulated the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it has almost
never engaged in Court-stripping, despite many calls over the years for it to do
so. Furthermore, the principal instance in which it did so, in 1868, may
constitute negative nonjudicial precedent. Although this history has been of
relatively limited importance to academics, it has been of great importance to
members of Congress and Executive Branch officials when they have considered the permissibility of limiting the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

Gardner counseled against Court-stripping. He described Yerger as indicating that the Court’s decision
in McCardle “was a grudging one and that [the Court] would not welcome subsequent legislation of
that character.” Gardner Memorandum, supra note 103, at 50.
211. 518 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1996).
212. See infra text accompanying notes 219–23.
213. Cf. Fallon, supra note 7, at 1047 (criticizing “the originalist and textualist style of reasoning
that has characterized nearly all leading academic writings on congressional control of jurisdiction”).
214. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 3, at 1836 (noting that, as compared with other separation of
powers work, “[t]here is . . . far less focus on political branch practice in Article III scholarship”).
215. Gunther, supra note 187, at 905.
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In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress did not authorize the Court to exercise
the full range of appellate jurisdiction established by Article III.216 Nonetheless,
the First Congress did authorize Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over a
broad range of cases, including over federal habeas corpus cases and state court
decisions invalidating federal statutes or upholding state statutes against federal
constitutional challenge.217 That jurisdictional grant, which was conferred by
section 25 of the First Judiciary Act, suggests that Congress was focused
primarily on ensuring the supremacy of federal law over the states, and less on
ensuring the uniformity of federal law throughout the nation.
The Marshall Court was similarly concerned with federal supremacy. It
exercised appellate jurisdiction under section 25 in the service of nationalism,
which proved intensely controversial and resulted in state defiance of certain
Supreme Court judgments.218 In 1831, the House Judiciary Committee voted to
repeal section 25, which would have constituted Court-stripping if it had
succeeded. Congress, however, rejected this effort by a wide margin. The
minority report opposing the bill, authored by then-Representative James Buchanan together with William W. Ellsworth and E.D. White, argued that without
section 25 “there would be no uniformity in the construction and administration
of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States” and that “its repeal
would seriously endanger the existence of this Union” by compromising the
supremacy of the federal government over the states.219 This report has been
hailed as “one of the great and signal documents in the history of American
constitutional law.”220
In 1868, as discussed above, the Reconstruction Congress apparently sought
to engage in Court-stripping for the first time in U.S. history.221 The politically
fraught circumstances of that action, however, may limit the extent to which it
serves as precedent, and, indeed, may suggest that it should be viewed as
negative nonjudicial precedent. Among other things, when Congress enacted the
jurisdiction-stripping measure over President Johnson’s veto, it was holding
impeachment hearings against him, and Chief Justice Chase had been presiding

216. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 24–25 (noting the $2,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, the absence of a provision for review of federal criminal cases, and the absence of a provision for
review of state court decisions upholding federal statutes or invalidating state statutes on federal
constitutional grounds).
217. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.
218. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 393–404 (1998) (discussing state defiance of
Marshall Court decisions); Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 741–42 (1998) (same).
219. H.R. REP. NO. 21-43, at 15 (1831).
220. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 199 (1922); see also
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 84, at 44 n.143 (describing the minority report as “one of the
famous documents of American constitutional law”). For an assessment of the political conditions that
contributed to the defeat of the bill, see Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power,
Political Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 ORE. L. REV. 95 (2009).
221. See supra Section III.A.
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over those proceedings.222 Even at the time, Congress thought better of following its own practice. The Court was able to exercise jurisdiction in Yerger mere
months after McCardle because, as Barry Friedman has noted, “the Republican
Congress declined to act yet again to strip the Court of jurisdiction.”223 Even
though Congress had enacted the original Court-stripping provision over President Johnson’s veto, that provision “was so criticized that once passions cooled,
and reflection prevailed, Congress and the country saw the error of trying to
affect substantive decisions with jurisdictional tools.”224
Congress subsequently turned from stripping the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to enhancing it. In 1891, Congress authorized the Court to exercise
appellate jurisdiction in federal criminal cases.225 And in 1914, Congress authorized the Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions
invalidating state laws on federal constitutional grounds or upholding federal
laws against constitutional challenge.226 Moreover, “on many occasions from
1891 to 1988, Congress made ‘exceptions’ to the Court’s mandatory appellate
jurisdiction and granted it discretionary review via writs of certiorari.”227
Responding to concerns expressed by the Court that it was overburdened with
mandatory appeals, Congress acted to enable the Justices to devote their scarce
institutional resources to ensuring uniformity on important questions of federal
law.228
In the modern, post-Brown era of constitutional law, many Court-stripping
measures were proposed in Congress. Their subject matters included jurisdiction over the admissibility of confessions in state criminal cases, state legislative apportionments, alleged subversive activities, busing, school prayer, abortion,
the Defense of Marriage Act, and the Pledge of Allegiance.229 But, like the
doomed 1831 effort, they all failed.
To be sure, during the last several decades, Congress has enacted some
controversial limitations on federal court jurisdiction—concerning federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions, judicial review of immigration
deportation orders, and federal habeas corpus review of the detention of alleged

222. See Gunther, supra note 187, at 904–05. On the atmosphere in which Congress acted, see
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte McCardle: The Power of Congress to Limit the Supreme
Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 57 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds.,
2010), and William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229
(1973).
223. Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, supra note 218, at
761.
224. Id.
225. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 297.
226. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
227. Grove, supra note 3, at 1846.
228. See id.; see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 931 (2013) (“Congress has not generally sought to curtail the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction but instead has steadily expanded it—precisely so that the Court could settle
disputed federal questions.”).
229. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 297–98.
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terrorists in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Most of these limitations, however, have
concerned either federal district court jurisdiction or general judicial review
over non-Article III adjudications, not efforts to use the Exceptions Clause to
limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The one provision that did expressly
concern the Supreme Court’s appellate review—a restriction on review of
Circuit Court determinations concerning whether to allow the filing of a successive habeas petition—was not, unlike the restriction at issue in McCardle,
focused on any particular Supreme Court decisions. The Court found that
restriction, in a move reminiscent of McCardle, not to eliminate the Supreme
Court’s ability to issue original writs of habeas corpus,230 and since then
Congress has not attempted to foreclose that alternate avenue of review.
C. DEBATES IN THE POLITICAL BRANCHES

Numerous jurisdiction-stripping measures were proposed in Congress and
considered by the Executive Branch in the decades after Brown. This Section
focuses on two of those debates: the congressional debate during 1957–1958
over proposals to restrict the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
alleged subversive activities, and the debate within the Executive Branch in the
early 1980s over efforts to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction over cases involving
school prayer, busing, and abortion. These debates illustrate the importance of
arguments based on both historical gloss and constitutional conventions in
political branch reasoning concerning the judicial separation of powers.
1. Congressional Debates in 1957 and 1958
In a long series of cases from 1953 to 1958 involving the investigation and
sanctioning of alleged political subversives, the Supreme Court repeatedly ruled
against the government.231 The cases arose in a variety of legal contexts
(noted below), and they were decided on a variety of legal grounds, some
technical and statutory, others constitutional. Taken together, they generated
widespread condemnation of the Court in and out of Congress.232

230. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660–62 (1996). The Court applied similar reasoning in
concluding that Congress had not deprived the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review an
Executive Branch determination that an individual was not eligible for discretionary relief from
deportation. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001). In addition, the Court held that
Congress’s attempt to restrict federal court habeas jurisdiction over the detainees at Guantanamo
violated the Suspension Clause in Article I, Section 9. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771
(2008).
231. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
397, 417–26 (2005).
232. See, e.g., id. at 426 (“By 1957, hostility toward the Court was widespread.”); Barry Friedman,
The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112
YALE L.J. 153, 195 (2002) (“During this period the Court faced its most serious institutional attack since
1937 (and indeed the last serious attack it has faced since).”).
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Among the “orgy of proposals countering the Court”233 that members of
Congress produced during this period was a bill proposed by Senator William
Ezra Jenner, a Republican from Indiana, that would have stripped five categories of cases out of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The categories of proposed
jurisdiction-stripping reflected the contexts in which the Court, over the previous several terms, had protected alleged communists: (1) state laws concerning
bar admissions; (2) congressional committee procedures, including contempt
proceedings against witnesses; (3) the employee loyalty program of the executive branch; (4) state statutes on subversive activities; and (5) loyalty programs
in educational institutions. Jenner contended that “Congress has conveyed upon
[the] Supreme Court the appellate power which it has, and Congress can curtail
or limit that power, under article III, paragraph 3, section 2 of the Constitution.”234 Jenner also noted that “[i]t may be there are other areas in which the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be restricted or with respect
to which such jurisdiction should be withdrawn.”235
A brief hearing was held on the bill in August 1957,236 and extensive
hearings were subsequently held in February and March 1958.237 Republican
Senator John Marshall Butler of Maryland—the same Senator who, a few years
earlier, sought to protect the Court’s independence—then moved to amend the
bill so that, among other things, it would strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
only over cases involving state bar admissions. With this significant reduction in
the jurisdiction-stripping aspects of the legislation (and other changes not
relating to jurisdiction, including provisions designed to overturn certain Court
decisions), what was now the Jenner–Butler bill was approved by the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
In defending the constitutionality of the bill, the Committee report explained
that “[w]ithdrawal of appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in a single
area, as would be effected by enactment of this bill as amended, is a minimal
use of the congressional power to regulate and make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”238 As for the decision to strike out the other
four limitations on appellate jurisdiction that Jenner had urged, the report
explained that:
233. Frickey, supra note 231, at 427; see William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State
Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 502 (2002)
(“While most Court-curbing bills vanished into obscurity the moment they were dropped into the
hopper, more Court-curbing measures received serious consideration during 1957–58 than at any time
in the nation’s history.”).
234. Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing on S. 2646
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act and Other Internal Sec. Laws of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 22–23 (1957) [hereinafter 1957 Subcommittee Hearings]
(statement of Sen. William E. Jenner).
235. Id. at 24.
236. See generally id.
237. See JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LIMITATION OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION AND STRENGTHENING OF ANTISUBVERSIVE LAWS, S. REP. NO. 85-1586, at 13 (1958).
238. Id. at 4.
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While it is clear that Congress has the power to withdraw jurisdiction as
proposed in these clauses, the committee has concluded that while Congress
has a duty to exercise its constitutional power with the objective of restoring a
proper balance of powers, it would be wisest for now to confine the use of this
power to a single area.239

Despite the support of the Judiciary Committee, the Jenner–Butler bill was
ultimately tabled in the full Senate, on a vote of 49 to 41, effectively killing
it.240 Commentators have offered a range of explanations for the Senate’s show
of restraint. Those explanations include then-Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson’s use of his mastery of the Senate to oppose the bill for various
political reasons.241 It also may have hurt the cause of proponents of the bill that
it attracted the support of segregationist members of Congress, who loathed the
Court.242 In addition, as it had done in 1937 with respect to New Deal measures,
the Court appeared to temper its decision making with respect to anticommunist
measures, thereby reducing some of the pressure for reform.243 Finally, Congress became more liberal as a result of the 1958 midterm elections, and this
ideological change reduced the likelihood that Court-stripping proposals would
be adopted.244 Those political explanations for the defeat of Court-stripping
efforts in this period should not be dismissed, just as they should not be
dismissed in accounting for the defeat of FDR’s Court-packing proposal.
As was the case in 1937, however, constitutional and conventional concerns
also figured prominently in the debate over the proposal. The Senate subcommittee hearings held in early 1958 on what was still the Jenner Bill comprise more
than one thousand printed pages, and many of the statements and letters
submitted in opposition to the proposed restrictions on the Court were framed in
constitutional or conventional terms.245 Moreover, just as in 1937, opponents

239. Id. at 5.
240. See 104 CONG. REC. S18,687 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1958).
241. See Frickey, supra note 231, at 430 (explaining that Johnson “opposed [the restrictions on the
Court] because they were Republican measures designed to split the Democrats, because they . . . made
the Senate look bad, and because of his own burning desire to be President, which required him to
demonstrate autonomy from the Southern bloc, seem ‘presidential’ rather than petty, and maintain
legitimacy in moderate and liberal circles”); see also ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON:
MASTER OF THE SENATE 1031–33 (2002) (detailing Johnson’s efforts to table the bill).
242. See Friedman, supra note 232, at 196.
243. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT: 1957–1960, at 121 (1961)
(“[T]he Court itself contributed to the defeat of the anti-Court legislation by subsequent moderation of
the position taken in some of its controversial decisions.”); Friedman, supra note 232, at 196 (noting
that the Court “tempered its prior positions in a series of decisions that might be called a second ‘switch
in time,’ at least creating the appearance that it was backing away from the earlier controversial
decisions”).
244. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 140–41 (2000).
245. See Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Hearings on S.
2646 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act and Other Internal Sec.
Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (2d. Sess. 1958) [hereinafter 1958 Subcommittee
Hearings].
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frequently appealed to the “spirit” of the Constitution, and this time they were
able to cite the defeat of FDR’s proposal as further support for their claim.
Illustrative is the testimony of Joseph Rauh, Jr., vice-chairman (and former
chairman) of the Americans for Democratic Action and a leading civil rights
lawyer. Invoking Henry Hart’s thesis regarding the Supreme Court’s “essential
role” in the constitutional system,246 Rauh contended that the Jenner Bill ran
afoul of the principle embodied in the thesis and speculated that the Supreme
Court would likely hold the bill unconstitutional.247 “[E]ven if I am mistaken in
this view,” said Rauh, “most professional opinion would agree that the bill, at
the very least, is anticonstitutional, because it violates the basic assumption of
the rule of law which is the essential characteristic of a free government—an
independent judiciary.”248 Rauh further testified that “[w]ere you to take away
substantial jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in important areas of American
life, you would be going contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”249
Jefferson Fordham, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
expressed similar views. He began by noting that “tradition requires that every
proposal to cut down the power of the Court be approached with great care and
subjected to detailed scrutiny.”250 He declined to take a position on the constitutionality of the Jenner Bill, noting only that there is a “respectable theory” that it
was unconstitutional.251 But he argued that, even if the proposed legislation was
not unconstitutional, it would “impugn the integrity of the judicial process.”252
Erwin Griswold, who also features in Part II of this Article because he had
testified before the Senate two decades earlier in opposition to FDR’s Courtpacking plan,253 submitted a written statement opposing the Jenner Bill. Now
Dean of the Harvard Law School, he explained that although the bill was
“probably constitutional,” “not everything that is constitutional is wise or
desirable.”254 In particular, Griswold argued that that the bill was “contrary to
the spirit of the Constitution,” because “[i]t is of the essence of the Constitution
that we have an independent judiciary,” whereas “[w]e will not have an
independent judiciary if the Congress takes jurisdiction away from the Supreme
Court whenever the Court decides a case that the Congress does not like.”255
Griswold also noted that the bill was “in many ways, like the Courtpacking plan advanced by President Roosevelt in 1937,” which he described as

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See Hart, supra note 201, at 1365.
See 1958 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 245, at 45.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 273.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–42.
1958 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 245, at 357.
Id.
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“an unwise and unfortunate proposal.”256
Attorney General William Rogers wrote a letter to the Committee opposing
the Jenner Bill, stating that “it is clear that this proposal is not based on general
considerations of policy relating to the judiciary,” but rather was “motivated
instead by dissatisfaction with certain recent decisions of the Supreme Court in
the areas covered and represents a retaliatory approach of the same general
character as the Court packing plan proposed in 1937.”257 He explained that he
had “disapproved of such an approach [in 1937] and I do now.”258 Rogers also
noted that “[o]nly once in our history has Congress enacted any legislation of
this kind,” namely “in 1868 during the troublous days of reconstruction when
jurisdiction was withdrawn from the Supreme Court in cases arising under the
Habeas Corpus Act,” an action that he said was subsequently realized to have
been a “mistake.”259 Finally, Rogers expressed concern that “[t]his type of
legislation threatens the independence of the judiciary” because “[t]he natural
consequences of such an enactment is that the courts would operate under the
constant apprehension that if they rendered unpopular decisions, jurisdiction
would be further curtailed.”260
Also testifying in opposition to the Jenner Bill was Senator Thomas Hennings, who expressed “very serious misgivings as to the constitutionality of [the
Bill].”261 He also was concerned that the bill “[w]ould establish a very dangerous precedent and would be a first step toward the destruction of our present
judicial system.”262 In addition, Hennings reflected on the events of “almost 100
years ago, when Congress enacted the only statute limiting the Court’s
jurisdiction”—namely, the legislation at issue in McCardle.263 Hennings quoted
from a senator who had objected to that legislation, while also noting that,
unlike that legislation, the Jenner Bill did not leave open an alternative avenue
of Supreme Court review.264
During this period, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
(ABA) passed a resolution opposing the Jenner Bill, even though the Association was strongly anti-communist and was critical of the Court’s decisions.265
The House of Delegates recalled the ABA’s support some years earlier for a
256. Id. at 357–58.
257. Id. at 573 (printing letter from William P. Rogers, Attorney Gen., to Senator James O. Eastland,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, dated March 4, 1958).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 1958 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 245, at 574.
261. Id. at 383. As discussed in Section II.F, four years earlier Hennings had opposed Senator
Butler’s proposed constitutional amendment concerning Court-packing. Assuming that Hennings spoke
candidly and that his views had not changed between 1954 and 1958, his concerns about the Jenner
Bill’s constitutionality suggest that his opposition to the Butler amendment was not based on a belief
that Court-stripping would be permissible.
262. Id. at 384.
263. Id. at 382.
264. See id. at 382–83.
265. See id. at 359.
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proposed constitutional amendment (discussed at the end of the previous Part)
that would have, among other things, ensured that the Court had appellate
jurisdiction over all constitutional matters, and it described the Jenner Bill as
“contrary to the maintenance of the balance of powers set up in the
Constitution.”266
Similar criticisms were directed at the Jenner–Butler bill, even though it had
only one (rather than five) Court-stripping measures. A minority of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, in opposing the Committee’s endorsement of the bill,
emphasized both constitutional and conventional concerns. Invoking structural
constitutional claims and historical practice, the minority argued that the remaining restriction on the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in that bill “strikes directly at
our historical tradition of separation of powers.”267 The minority also worried
that, if enacted, the bill would “establish a dangerous precedent” because it
would “open the way to Congress to whittle away at the Federal judiciary
whenever the majority disagreed with a decision of the Supreme Court.”268 The
minority further pointed out that “[t]he deans of most American law schools, the
house of delegates of the American Bar Association, the Attorney General,
and many outstanding lawyers have voiced strong opposition to this provision.”269 Attached to the minority report was, among other things, a legal
memorandum prepared by Senator Hennings in which he argued that “mere
disagreement with a decision of the Supreme Court is not grounds for withdrawing jurisdiction,” and that “[v]iolence will be done to the spirit of the United
States Constitution even by this limited withdrawal of jurisdiction and a dangerous precedent will be established.”270
During the full Senate debate over the Jenner–Butler bill, opponents similarly
invoked constitutional and conventional concerns. Senator Alexander Wiley
argued that, although the Jenner–Butler bill was less objectionable than the
original Jenner Bill, “[i]t would do violence to the basic structure of American
government.”271 He acknowledged that Congress had power to make exceptions
to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but he denied that this was “a
total right.”272 In his view, the line marking the precise boundaries of this power
was uncertain, and, as a result, “the Founding Fathers expected we would
depend upon . . . the moral sense of the legislators.”273 As examples of what
should be avoided, he invoked what he described as “two great instances of
mortal error”—the legislation at issue in “the notorious McCardle case” and

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

1958 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 245, at 359.
S. REP. NO. 85-1586, at 12 (1958).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 30.
104 CONG. REC. S18,682 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1958).
Id.
Id. at 18,683.
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FDR’s Court-packing plan.274
Senator Hennings made similar arguments against the bill.275 In addition, in a
move somewhat akin to the introduction of the letter from Chief Justice Hughes
during the 1937 debate over Court-packing, Hennings submitted a letter concerning the Jenner Bill that he had solicited from Judge Learned Hand, the highly
esteemed judge from the Second Circuit.276 Hand, who by that point had retired
from the bench, had recently delivered the Holmes lectures at Harvard Law
School, in which he had criticized the Warren Court’s broad use of the power of
judicial review.277 Those lectures were invoked numerous times during the
hearings on the bill, both by supporters and opponents.278 Hennings explained
to Hand that he thought certain provisions in the bill “raise very serious
constitutional questions,” and he said that he “would appreciate [Hand’s] views
on this bill.”279 In his response, Hand wrote that, although he did not think it
appropriate for him as a retired judge to comment on the constitutional questions raised by the bill, in his opinion “such a statute if enacted would be
detrimental to the best interests of the United States,” and that in his view it was
“desirable that the Court should have the last word on questions of the character
involved.”280 As noted by Gerald Gunther in his magisterial biography of Hand,
“Hand’s letter to Senator Hennings cut the ground out from under reactionaries’
and segregationists’ efforts to invoke him in support of their plans.”281
In sum, many of the themes illustrated by the debate over FDR’s Courtpacking plan reemerged in the 1957–1958 debates over Court-stripping. Opponents appealed to a mix of constitutional and conventional concerns, sometimes
blurring the two categories, and in doing so they frequently invoked either the
spirit of the Constitution or the idea that legislation could be anticonstitutional
even if not technically unconstitutional. They also attributed normative weight
to a long history of lack of congressional restriction, and they expressed a fear
that even a small step towards restriction would set a dangerous precedent.
Furthermore, they suggested that earlier efforts to restrict the Court, including
FDR’s proposal, should be treated as negative precedent.
Like the defeat of FDR’s Court-packing plan, the defeat of the Jenner–Butler
Bill probably also further bolstered the perceived constitutional or conventional
274. Id. at 18,682.
275. See id. at 18,686.
276. See id. at 18,685.
277. The lectures were published in LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
278. See, e.g., 1958 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 245, at 76–77, 91, 211, 219, 266, 430–31,
500, 502, 534–35, 573, 678, 680.
279. 104 CONG. REC. S18,673 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1958).
280. Id. Hand made clear in a follow-up letter that he had been addressing only the desirability of
limiting Court review, not other aspects of the bill. See id. For an account of Hennings’ role in opposing
both the Jenner and Jenner–Butler Bills, including his solicitation of the Hand letter, see Irving Dilliard,
Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., and the Supreme Court, 26 MO. L. REV. 429 (1961).
281. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 661 (1994); see also POWE, supra
note 244, at 132 (“Without Hand [supporting the legislation], it really was the yahoos against the
establishment.”).
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norm against taking such action. In a book-length treatment of the efforts in this
period to strip the Court’s jurisdiction, C. Herman Pritchett, a political scientist,
concluded that the defeat of the Jenner–Butler Bill might have “had the effect of
permanently neutralizing what is perhaps the most drastic congressional authority over the Court, the control of its appellate jurisdiction.”282 Pritchett explained that, whatever the scope of Congress’s power to limit Supreme Court
jurisdiction as an original matter, historical practice and norms may now have
had the effect of limiting this power:
It may well be argued that the clause in the Constitution giving Congress
control over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction has in effect now been repealed
by the passage of time and by the recognition that exercise of such power
would be in the truest sense subversive of the American tradition of an
independent judiciary.283

2. Executive Branch Debate in the Early 1980s
In November 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President and the Republican
Party took control of the Senate for the first time since 1955. Congressional
Republicans were finally positioned to give voice to long-simmering conservative frustration over perceived liberal decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts
in the areas of reproductive rights, school desegregation, and school prayer. One
response they contemplated was to strip the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, of jurisdiction to hear cases relating to those issues. In the early
1980s, more than twenty Court-stripping bills were circulating in Congress.284
Sponsors of the bills, including North Carolina Republicans Jesse Helms and
John P. East, were “frank to say that the theory behind their efforts is simple—if
you don’t like the way the court decides a case, tell the judges they can’t decide
it.”285 Although the existence of those bills is well-known, much less wellknown is the robust debate that they triggered within the Justice Department
over the permissibility of Court-stripping—and the role in that debate of the
current Chief Justice of the United States.
On July 16, 1981, Theodore Olson, then-head of the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC), distributed a fifty-one page, single-spaced memorandum from OLC
concluding that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to engage in Courtstripping.286 In this memorandum, which the authors of this Article obtained
through a request under the Freedom of Information Act, Olson reported that
OLC had concluded that most of the proposed Court-stripping bills “would

282. PRITCHETT, supra note 243, at 121–22.
283. Id. at 122.
284. See, e.g., Nadine Cohodas, Members Move to Rein in Supreme Court, 39 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
947, 947 (1981) (describing the “new court-curbing bills—23 in the House, four in the Senate”).
285. Id.
286. See Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to the Attorney Gen. (July 16, 1981) [hereafter Memorandum from Olson] (on file with the authors).
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probably be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,” and he noted that
similar views about the unconstitutionality of Court-stripping had been expressed by Attorney General William Rogers in 1958 concerning the Jenner
Bill.287 Olson explained that “[t]he power to adjudicate the constitutionality of
state and federal laws is unquestionably at the heart of the federal judicial
power.”288 While he acknowledged that “Supreme Court decisions are inconclusive on the question,”289 he insisted that “neither McCardle nor Yerger constitutes an authoritative statement in support of the constitutionality of bills that
purport to deprive the Court of any opportunity to assess a constitutional
issue.”290
Olson thought that the text of Article III “offers some support for the limited
proposition that Congress is not authorized to carve out so many exceptions as
to engulf the general grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court,” but
he conceded that “[t]hat proposition does not . . . provide dispositive guidance
on the constitutionality of the bills under consideration.”291 He reasoned, however, that “[c]onstitutional tradition and history suggest that the Supreme Court
must exercise the critical function of reviewing state and federal actions for
consistency with the Constitution.”292 In addition to considering Founding
history, Olson looked (for almost six pages) to post-Founding “[h]istorical
practice . . . with particular emphasis on the practice in the decades immediately
succeeding ratification of the Constitution.”293 After reviewing this early practice, Olson then turned to modern history, noting that “[w]e are not aware of any
attempts to limit the Court’s jurisdiction during the first half of the Twentieth
Century.”294 He also observed that “[i]n the years between 1953 and
1968 . . . over sixty bills were introduced to eliminate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts over certain subjects,” and he emphasized that “[n]one was
enacted.”295 Olson concluded this portion of his analysis by explaining the
pertinence of historical practice to his constitutional analysis. “The historical
practice with respect to the Exceptions Clause,” he wrote, “does not, of course,
establish that the Clause was not intended to confer plenary power on Congress.”296 “However,” he continued, “the facts that many members of Congress
have expressed constitutional reservations over the years, and that no Congress
except during 1868 ever decided to exercise the supposed power, are not

287. Id. at 16; see also supra text accompanying notes 257–60 (discussing Rogers’ position on the
Jenner Bill).
288. Memorandum from Olson, supra note 286, at 18.
289. Id. at 19.
290. Id. at 22.
291. Id. at 25–26.
292. Id. at 26.
293. Id. at 32.
294. Memorandum from Olson, supra note 286, at 37.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 37–38.
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without significance.”297
Olson also argued that “the structure of the Constitution is inconsistent with
the view that the Exceptions Clause confers plenary power on Congress to
eliminate the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional questions.”298 He predicted that “Professor Hart’s approach”—his essential functions thesis—“in one form or another[] would most probably be embraced by
the Supreme Court.”299 More specifically, he expected the Court to hold that,
“in making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
Congress may not enact provisions that eliminate the Court’s essential functions
of declaring the constitutional boundaries dividing the federal government, the
States, and the people, and assuring uniformity in the interpretation of the
Constitution.”300
Olson’s memorandum prompted a vigorous response from another Justice
Department attorney, John Roberts, who was at that time a Special Assistant to
Attorney General William French Smith. Whereas Olson pushed back against
conservative frustration with the Court, Roberts defended the constitutionality
of its expression.
Roberts prepared a twenty-seven-page, single-spaced memorandum setting
forth constitutional arguments in favor of Congress’s power to control the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.301 The memorandum, which did
not become publicly available until 2005 as part of a document release by the
National Archives when Roberts was nominated to the Court, indicates that it
was prepared at the suggestion of Ken Starr, who at that time was a counselor to
Attorney General Smith. Roberts made clear that he prepared the memorandum
“from a standpoint of advocacy” and that his analysis “does not purport to be an
objective review of the issue.”302 Consistent with that description, the memorandum reads like it was written by a skilled advocate, not an impartial judge or
seasoned academic, even as it relies heavily on the views (canvassed above) of
scholars like Wechsler, Bator, Redish, Van Alstyne, and Paul Mishkin. Nevertheless, the memorandum appears to have reflected Roberts’ own views at the time,
as he confirmed in writing a few years later (although he also made clear at that
time that he opposed Court-stripping as a policy matter).303

297. Id. at 38.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 41–42.
300. Id. at 42.
301. See Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen. to the Attorney
Gen. (no date), http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0172/006-Box5-Folder152
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SXK-NLXX] [hereinafter Roberts Memo]. Although the memorandum is
undated, it was apparently prepared in October 1981, after Roberts attended an American Enterprise
Institute conference early that month entitled “Judicial Power in the United States: What are the
Appropriate Constraints?” See id. at 1.
302. Id. at 2.
303. See infra note 307; see also Mark Agrast, Judge Roberts and the Court-Stripping Movement,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2005), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/“lar issues, but he
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In his analysis, Roberts began by emphasizing the plain meaning of the
Exceptions Clause, contending that its “clear and unequivocal language is the
strongest argument in favor of congressional power.”304 He then turned to
the Founding history of this clause, concluding that it “is not particularly
revealing and does not justify a departure from the plain meaning of the
words.”305 Roberts relied more heavily on judicial precedent, especially the
Court’s reasoning in McCardle.306 “McCardle,” he wrote, “is simply the most
prominent in a long and consistent line of judicial opinions reading the exceptions clause as meaning exactly what it says.”307
For the most part, Roberts did not invoke longstanding practice as an
independent source of constitutional authority supporting his position. Rather,
he primarily invoked historical practice in the course of contesting the emphasis
of proponents of the essential functions thesis on the pivotal role of the Court in
ensuring the uniformity and supremacy of federal law. Roberts explained that
the essential functions thesis “confuses a permissive grant of constitutional
authority [to grant jurisdiction to the Court] with a constitutional requirement.”308 He also noted that, from the beginning, Congress withheld certain
categories of appellate jurisdiction that might have been useful in maintaining
uniformity and supremacy—specifically, over state court decisions striking
down state laws on federal constitutional grounds until 1914, over state court
decisions upholding the validity of federal statutes throughout the nineteenth
century, and over federal criminal cases until 1889—and yet those limitations
were widely accepted.309 The relatively minor role of historical practice in the

added that ’intiff show beyond a ” parties to enforce statutory provisions? legal rights.y suffices for
Acivil-liberties/news/2005/09/02/1622/judge-roberts-and-the-court-stripping-movement/ [https://perma.
cc/7CSP-5JHL] (“[I]t is hard to read [the 1981 memo] as anything other than an expression of Roberts’
enthusiastic personal views.”); David Espo, Files Reveal Roberts’ Work Under Reagan, WASH. POST
(July 27, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/07/27/LI2005072701850_
pf.html [https://perma.cc/5SUK-ADV4] (“As a lawyer in the Reagan White House, John Roberts wrote
that Congress had authority to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases involving school
prayer and similar issues, but he added that ‘such bills were bad policy and should be opposed.’”).
304. Roberts Memo, supra note 301, at 2.
305. Id. at 4.
306. Id. at 8–10.
307. Id. at 12. Roberts used similar language while working in the White House Counsel’s Office in
1985, in response to an inquiry about the constitutionality of a Court-stripping bill involving cases
challenging voluntary school prayer; he explained that his views on the constitutionality of Courtstripping “did not carry the day” within the Justice Department, which issued an opinion “concluding
that the [Exceptions Clause] did not mean what it said.” Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F.
Fielding (May 6, 1985), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/roberts/Box48JGRSchoolPrayer1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N52F-ALLH]. Roberts also wrote that “[t]here is much to be said for the virtues of stare
decisis in this area, and I think I would recommend that we adhere to the old misguided opinion and let
sleeping dogs (an apt reference, given my view of the opinion) lie.” Id. “On the other hand,” he
continued, “I know this issue has been close to the hearts of some who are now over at Justice, so there
could be a push for reconsideration.” Id.
308. Roberts Memo, supra note 301, at 15.
309. See id. at 16–18. Roberts also wrote that “[t]hose who truly believe that the exercise of this
exceptions power threatens the system of checks and balances should pursue the remedy suggested by
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Roberts memorandum reflects the interpretive orientation of the legal academics
upon whom he principally relied.
The following spring, on April 12, 1982, Olson distributed another memorandum on the topic.310 That memorandum, which became publicly available in
2005 along with the Roberts memorandum, detailed “policy and/or political
arguments” that “might be made for and against the legislation which would
withdraw Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over classes of constitutional
cases.”311 The beginning of the memorandum noted arguments in favor,312 but
the bulk of it developed “Arguments Against Jurisdictional Withdrawal.”313
Although labeled policy or political arguments, what is most interesting about
these arguments is their tendency to bleed into conventional claims and their
invocation of the negative precedent of FDR’s attempt to pack the Court in
1937.
Olson noted that “[e]liminating Supreme Court jurisdiction over specific
classes of cases would deprive the nation of a single and authoritative statement
of what the Constitution means in these areas,” which was worrisome in part
because the “Court has an important, intangible institutional role in ensuring
due respect for the Constitution and the rule of law in our society.”314 Olson
seemed to think that more was at stake for the functioning of the constitutional
system than a question of policy or politics.
Olson next observed that “[e]liminating Supreme Court jurisdiction would
remove the possibility of modifying or overruling existing precedent.”315 He
also reasoned that:
If the purpose of these bills is to obtain decisions by state or federal courts
which depart from the rules previously announced by the Supreme Court, that
purpose implicitly contains an invitation to state and federal court judges to

Justice [Owen] Roberts, namely amendment of the Constitution to remove Congress’ exceptions
power.” Id. at 21. John Roberts observed (as detailed in Section II.F, supra) that the ABA had supported
such an amendment, but that it was tabled in the House. Id. “In light of the foregoing,” he continued, “it
is perhaps not unfair to criticize those who argue against the power of Congress under the exceptions
clause as the ones who are circumventing the amendment process.” Id.
310. Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
the Attorney Gen. (Apr. 12, 1982), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/olson_04_
12_1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZDC-YFKC] [hereinafter Olson Policy Memo].
311. Id. at 1. Roberts wrote skeptical comments on the Olson policy memorandum. See R. Jeffrey
Smith et al., Documents Show Roberts Influence in Reagan Era, WASH. POST (July 27, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/26/AR2005072602070_pf.html [https://
perma.cc/6GB9-YZDC].
312. See Olson Policy Memo, supra note 310, at 1–2 (stating that “[s]uch legislation is needed to
curb judicial activism,” is “a way of expressing popular disenchantment with the Court’s decisions,”
and is “strongly supported by the President’s most loyal and powerful constituents”).
313. Id. at 3; see id. at 3–9.
314. Id. at 3–4.
315. Id. at 5.
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violate their oaths and the principle of respect for law by issuing opinions
inconsistent with binding authority.316

Although not arguing that such a purpose would render the bills unconstitutional, Olson did suggest that it would be normatively problematic.
Olson then argued that Court-stripping bills “are, in effect, attempts to amend
the Constitution without resort to the constitutional processes for doing so.”317
“Even if not unconstitutional,” he insisted, “they run counter to the evident
purposes of the Framers,”318 an invocation that is similar to previous invocations of the spirit of the Constitution. Olson appeared to draw lessons from the
two ways in which FDR had sought to change the composition of the Court. “It
is entirely proper,” he wrote, “for the President to appoint individuals whose
judicial philosophy is in accordance with his views and the popular mood,” but
Court-stripping, “[e]ven if not unconstitutional, . . . would short-circuit this accepted and legitimate way of creating the potential for altering the prevailing
interpretation of the Constitution.”319
Olson also feared setting a precedent that would damage the constitutional
structure. “Once the principle is established,” he wrote, “immense pressures will
be generated by special interest groups to divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in any number of fields.”320 Moreover, “[e]ven if not unconstitutional,” he
maintained that “these bills would upset the policy of checks and balances
embodied in the Constitution” because the Court “has traditionally acted as a
check on popular passions.”321
Finally, Olson noted that the Court-stripping bills in circulation “are opposed
by the vast majority of the bench and bar,” and that “[i]gnoring this opposition
will appear to be unwise or anti-constitutional—an undesirable image to develop.”322 Although phrased in terms of public perception, which may be a
political matter, the reference to “anti-constitutionality” echoes conventional
arguments made over the previous decades in debates over Court-packing and
Court-stripping. Likewise, Olson thought there were “sound political reasons to
oppose these bills.”323 “History suggests,” he wrote, “that the people are
316. Id. Decades later, Richard Fallon independently developed this point and argued that it was
constitutional in stature. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 1083 (“Because it is almost always reprehensible
for government officials—including judges—to engage in law-breaking, Congress’s power over jurisdiction should not be interpreted as a license to encourage lawbreaking by either state or federal officials
or by state court judges. Legislation barring both Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction
over challenges to anti-abortion legislation or school prayer should, accordingly, be held invalid based
on its constitutionally forbidden purpose of encouraging defiance of applicable Supreme Court precedent.” (internal citations omitted)).
317. Olson Policy Memo, supra note 310, at 6.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 7.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 6.
323. Olson Policy Memo, supra note 310, at 8.
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extremely wary of any frontal assault on the Court,” and that it was “instructive” to consider FDR’s “experience in 1937.”324 Olson also opined that “[o]pposition to jurisdictional limits on constitutional grounds will be considered as a
position of courage, integrity and principle.”325 Again, Olson framed these
considerations in terms of public perception of the President, but his belief that
the public would perceive a question of integrity and principle to be at stake
suggests his recognition that Court-stripping would potentially violate perceived
norms of proper governmental behavior.
Olson appears to have presupposed that he had only two conceptual categories to work with: constitutional law and ordinary policy/politics. Thus, any
argument against Court-packing that he did not believe fit within the first
category he apparently felt the need to shoehorn into the second. Upon inspection, however, it is apparent that Olson was working with three categories, not
two: law, conventions, and policy/politics.
One week later, Olson returned to the law category. On April 19, 1982, he
distributed another memorandum, which states that it was designed to supplement the constitutional analysis in the July 1981 memorandum, given all that
has been “written and spoken on the subject since then.”326 This memorandum,
which Mr. Olson provided to the authors of this Article, has not previously been
made publicly available.
The April 19 memorandum, which is twenty-one single-spaced pages, appears to have been at least in part a response to Roberts. In the memorandum,
Olson critiqued four arguments, one of which was that “[t]here is no support in
the debates at the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist papers, the cases, or
the actions of early Congresses for the view that Congress does not have the
authority to remove any and all of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”327 He insisted that “[s]ome of the most significant Supreme Court decisions in our history have articulated the Supreme Court’s vital function in
ensuring uniformity and consistency in constitutional law,”328 that “[n]umerous
statements at the Constitutional Convention recognized the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction as constitutionally essential to maintain the uniformity and
supremacy of federal law,”329 that “[t]he Federalist also contains a number of
significant statements recognizing the Supreme Court’s essential role in the
constitutional scheme,”330 and that “[t]he failure of Congress in the First
324. Id.
325. Id. at 9.
326. See Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
for the Attorney Gen. 1 (April 19, 1982) [hereinafter Second Olson Constitutional Memo] (on file with
the authors).
327. Id. at 13.
328. Id. (discussing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 306 (1806), Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821), and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517–18
(1858)).
329. Id. at 15.
330. Id. at 16 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 39, 80, 82) (James Madison).
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Judiciary Act to provide the Court with the full appellate jurisdiction authorized
under Article III does not . . . cast any substantial doubt on our conclusion that
Congress cannot divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over constitutional
cases, for several reasons.”331
Substantiating the last point, Olson noted that the first Congress “recognized
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over an extremely broad range of constitutional cases,” most significantly under section 25 of the Judiciary Act notwithstanding “the intense controversy which it sparked among the states.”332 He
further reasoned that, “[t]o the extent that any inferences can be drawn from the
failure of the First Judiciary Act explicitly to recognize the full range of the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over constitutional cases, those inferences are subject to refutation by later events.”333 He explained that “the
Supreme Court now has appellate jurisdiction over all federal cases,” that
“[e]ach of the areas of incomplete jurisdiction has long since been fulfilled,”
and that “[t]he vast majority of constitutional decisions which are on the books
today, and which affect our national life in many and important ways, have been
rendered by the Court under a statutory regime which included such broad
appellate jurisdiction.”334 Invoking Justice Frankfurter’s articulation of the
authority of historical gloss in Youngstown, Olson urged that “[t]he gloss which
life has written on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is one in which the Court
stands as the final arbiter of constitutional questions.”335 Olson also thought it
“noteworthy” that “throughout our history there have been movements to curb
the Court’s jurisdiction which have never succeeded.”336 Finally, Olson observed that “none of the provisions of the Judiciary Act which have been read to
deny the Court appellate jurisdiction over classes of constitutional cases were
ever challenged in court.”337
Importantly, Attorney General Smith sided with Olson over Roberts.338 Smith
went public in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee dated
May 6, 1982, which was deemed sufficiently important that it was made a
formal OLC opinion.339 Smith explained that he was writing in response to

331. Id. at 18.
332. Second Olson Constitutional Memo, supra note 326, at 18–19.
333. Id. at 19.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 19–20.
337. Id. at 20.
338. Why Smith sided with Olson is both interesting and potentially overdetermined. Part of the
explanation may be that he was more persuaded by Olson’s analysis of the relevant constitutional,
conventional, and policy considerations. Another part of the explanation may have to do with the
institutional incentives of the Executive Branch to support judicial independence. See Tara Leigh
Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 263–66, 301–06
(2012) (discussing the incentives of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and the Solicitor
General).
339. Constitutionality of Legis. Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to Consider Cases Relating
to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 13 (1982) [hereinafter Smith Letter]. Olson has explained that he
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earlier inquiries from members of the committee concerning a bill that would
strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising out of any state
regulation relating to voluntary prayer in public schools and public buildings.
Smith emphasized that such legislation raised fundamental and unsettled constitutional questions under the separation of powers doctrine, and he quoted
Frankfurter and Landis in explaining why the questions were so difficult: “The
accommodations among the three branches of government . . . are undefined,
and in the very nature of things could not have been defined, by the Constitution.”340 Smith concluded that Congress possesses some authority under the
Exceptions Clause to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Court (and
possesses substantially more authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts), but that Congress may not, “consistent with the Constitution,
make ‘exceptions’ to Supreme Court jurisdiction which would intrude upon the
core functions of the Supreme Court as an independent and equal branch in our
system of separation of powers.”341
Smith made several arguments in support of the Justice Department’s adoption of the “essential functions” thesis. Most importantly for present purposes,
Smith invoked historical practice—“the historical record regarding the authority
actually asserted by Congress to control the Court’s appellate jurisdiction”342—as an independent source of constitutional authority. Like Olson’s
second memorandum on the constitutional issues, Smith conceded that the First
Judiciary Act did not authorize the Court to exercise all of the appellate
jurisdiction established by Article III. Nevertheless, he thought it noteworthy
that the statute “recognized the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over an extremely
broad range of constitutional cases,” most significantly under section 25, notwithstanding “the intense controversy which it sparked among the states.”343 In
addition, Smith expressly invoked Justice Frankfurter’s articulation of the authority of historical gloss, noting that even if “inferences can be drawn from the
failure of the First Judiciary Act explicitly to recognize the full range of the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over constitutional cases, those inferences are subject to refutation by later events.”344 Reproducing Olson’s statements about the modern scope of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, Smith
concluded that “[t]he gloss which life has written on the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction is one which protects the essential role of the Court in the constitutional plan.”345
drafted the letter for Smith. See Emails from Theodore B. Olson, to Neil S. Siegel (Nov. 17, 2015, 5:06
PM) (on file with authors). The letter draws heavily from Olson’s memoranda.
340. Smith Letter, supra note 339, at 14 (quoting Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of
Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation
of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1016 (1924)).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 24.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 25.
345. Id.
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Smith closed by purporting to move from constitutional law to “concerns as a
policy matter” with Court-stripping.346 Like the Olson policy memorandum,
however, Smith’s concerns sounded at least as much in conventions as it did in
policy or political considerations. He wrote that “[h]istory counsels against
depriving th[e] Court of its general appellate jurisdiction over federal questions.”347 Emphasizing the need to ensure the uniformity and supremacy of
federal law, he concluded that the “integrity of our system of federal law
depends upon a single court of last resort having a final say on the resolution of
federal questions.”348
This early 1980s debate within the Justice Department contains many of the
same themes that were present in the 1957–1958 debates over Court-stripping
and the 1937 debate over Court-packing. Moreover, like the upshot of those
earlier debates, the Smith OLC opinion—which remains the Justice Department’s most recent official position on the issue—likely reinforced the perceived constitutional or conventional norm against frontal attacks on the
independence of the Court. The 1980s episode confirms that, in controversies
between the political branches about the courts, historical practice may be
relevant not only to members of Congress, but also to high-ranking Executive
Branch officials.
Equally noteworthy, however, are the differences between the 1980s debate
within the Justice Department and the earlier debates. Olson and Smith appealed to both constitutional and conventional concerns, but, perhaps because
they wrote in their capacity as modern lawyers, they did not tend to blur those
two categories. Indeed, Olson wrote separate memoranda on those subjects.
Olson and Smith instead tended to blur the categories of conventions and
politics/policy, and did not appear to comprehend that they were separate
categories. Just as the concept of a constitutional convention appears to have
been lost for a time in much American constitutional scholarship, so it appears
to have been lost for a time in the arguments of at least some high-ranking
government officials.349
D. CONCLUSION

As with the discussion of the 1937 debate over FDR’s Court-packing plan,
the foregoing accounts of debates over Court-stripping proposals are not meant
346. Smith Letter, supra note 339, at 26.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. This Article can only speculate about why the concept of conventions became less prominent
for a time in American constitutional reasoning. Part of the explanation may be an increased tendency
to equate constitutional law with Supreme Court decision making, which itself may have resulted from
the more active role played by the Court in addressing controversial social issues starting in the 1950s.
The subsequent rise of originalism as an interpretive theory during the 1970s and 1980s—something
evident in the debate between Olson and Roberts—may also have had a tendency to suppress
consideration of conventions. As noted in Part I, efforts to credit post-Founding governmental practice
are more compatible with nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.
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to deny the importance of political factors in contributing to the defeat of the
proposals. Among other things, as Tara Grove has explained, the veto points
associated with the constitutional process for lawmaking may themselves operate as a protection against Court-stripping.350 The claim animating this Part,
rather, is that a focus only on politics misses the extent to which the political
branches have grappled with constitutional and conventional concerns about
Court-stripping.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOSS AND CONVENTIONS FOR THE JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF
POWERS
Using insights obtained from the debates over Court-packing and Courtstripping, this Part reflects on the implications of historical gloss and constitutional conventions for the judicial separation of powers more generally. It
begins by noting some ways in which the potential benefits of gloss and
conventions, typically considered only in the context of the political branches,
appear to translate to the context of the federal judiciary, while also noting some
differences between those contexts. Next, it reflects on a central feature of the
debates recounted above about Court-packing and Court-stripping: the uncertain
line between politics and conventions, and between conventions and gloss, as
well as the frequent blurring of those categories in normative argumentation.
Finally, this Part highlights a number of other issues relating to the authority
and independence of the federal courts that might benefit from similar consideration in light of gloss and conventions.
A. GLOSS AND CONVENTIONS IN THE JUDICIAL CONTEXT

The previous two Parts have shown that, in debates over Court-packing and
Court-stripping, there have been repeated and, by all appearances, serious
appeals to historical gloss and constitutional conventions. Put differently, gloss
and conventions appear to be doing important work in normative arguments
about the judicial separation of powers outside the courts. Although the causal
influence of those normative arguments in defeating various proposals is difficult to establish, debates within Congress and the Executive Branch at least
suggest that purely political explanations for the defeat of Court-packing in
1937 and Court-stripping in the 1950s and 1980s are descriptively incomplete.
Whether historical practice should do such work in interpretive debates about
the independence of the Supreme Court, or other questions relating to the
judicial separation of powers, is a separate question. The principal goal of this
Article is to show that the concepts of historical gloss and constitutional
conventions can shed new light on how participants in interpretive debates
reason about the judicial separation of powers, not to offer a normative defense
of those concepts or to apply them as part of a normative inquiry into the

350. See generally Grove, supra note 14.
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permissibility of Court-packing or Court-stripping. As a result, this Article does
not take a position on whether Court-packing or Court-stripping is constitutional. The debates recounted in this Article suggest that if one accepts the
authority of gloss and conventions, and if other historic debates about packing
or stripping included similar forms of reasoning with similar influence and
results, then serious arguments can be made that Court-packing and Courtstripping violate either the Constitution or constitutional conventions. But that
is all this Article can establish.
It is worth noting, however, that many of the potential justifications for
relying on historical practice in separation of powers disputes—explored in
other scholarship351—potentially apply in the context of the judicial separation
of powers. For example, the practice might reflect the considered constitutional
views of the institutions involved, and those views might merit deference by
courts or subsequent institutional actors. Such deference could be warranted for
a variety of reasons, some of which reflect the expertise of government officials
and some of which are similar to the reasons for deferring to past judicial
decisions, such as promoting the rule-of-law values of consistency and predictability. Another somewhat related rationale for crediting longstanding practice
is that such practice might be evidence of an arrangement that has worked
reasonably well, an important consideration for constitutional analyses that,
whether expressly or implicitly, incorporate Burkean and consequentialist reasoning. There might also be reliance interests at stake if the institutions involved or
third parties have organized their conduct around the practice. In addition, in
situations in which other modalities of constitutional interpretation do not
provide much guidance, so that it is difficult to develop a normative sense of
what the proper allocation of power between the branches should be, practice
may offer the most objective decisional material. Finally, if the foundations of
law lie in acceptance, as H.L.A. Hart famously argued,352 historical practice
may inform the actual terms of that acceptance. All of these justifications for
crediting historical practice seem just as potentially applicable in interpretive
debates between the political branches about the limits of their own authority
vis-à-vis the courts as they are in interpretive debates about the limits of their
own authority vis-à-vis one another.
Another attraction of historical gloss and constitutional conventions is the
interpretive flexibility that they offer in light of perceived changes over time in
the needs of American governance. That feature, too, seems relevant to the
judicial separation of powers. Just as the Executive Branch has changed dramatically since the Founding, so too has the federal judiciary, along various dimensions. Among other things, there have been substantial changes in the number of
federal judges and courts; the organization of the lower federal courts; the
number of cases; the scope of jurisdiction; and the nature of the appointments
351. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 426–28.
352. See HART, supra note 56, at 58–60.
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process.353 Those changes heighten the need for flexibility in constitutional
analysis in this area so that such analysis can continue protecting the independence of the judiciary while also allowing for majoritarian checks on the
judiciary.
Even more significant than the above changes may be the explosion of
constitutional rights since Brown v. Board of Education. On the one hand, the
dramatic expansion of judicial protections may reflect a public expectation that
courts have a muscular role to play in vindicating individual rights. On the other
hand, the robust regime of judicial review that exists today may mean that there
will be more frequent occasions in which politicians will threaten federal courts
with various kinds of punishment for controversial decisions. The debates over
Court-stripping discussed in Part III offer evidence of that dynamic. Given the
vastly different role that courts play in American society today, as opposed to
1789—when Article III became operative—it is not clear why originalism
should exclusively determine the limits on the authority of politicians to punish
judges for controversial decisions by, say, adding to their membership, stripping
their jurisdiction, or impeaching them.
Although the justifications for crediting historical practice in the congressional–
executive realm also apply to the judicial realm, there are important differences
between those two contexts. For example, most discussions of historical practice as it relates to the distribution of authority between Congress and the
Executive Branch focus on disputes between those two branches. Historical
practice is potentially relevant to questions of judicial independence and power,
however, not only when there are disputes between the political branches and
the courts, but also when there are disputes between the President and Congress
about the courts. The judiciary, in other words, can be a player in a separation
of powers dispute or it can be the subject of such a dispute.354 More subtly, the
judiciary may end up being a player when it is the subject, by tempering its
decision making or otherwise acting to help defuse a situation, as arguably
happened in both the Court-packing and Court-stripping debates described in
this Article.
The concept of institutional “acquiescence,” often thought to be a key
component of gloss as between Congress and the executive branch,355 may also
operate differently or be less applicable in the context of the judicial separation
of powers. Courts can act institutionally only when they have cases properly
before them, and they have relatively few “soft law” tools to indicate their
views about the law. Courts may thus have less opportunity to express acquiescence or nonacquiescence than other institutions.356 That said, one tool of
353. For an overview, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 1–47.
354. We thank our colleagues Joseph Blocher and Maggie Lemos for suggesting this distinction.
355. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432–38.
356. The Court has engaged in limited nonacquiescence concerning Congress’s establishment of
non-Article III tribunals. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63–64 (1982).
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nonacquiescence that the Supreme Court has used several times in the context
of jurisdiction-stripping, including arguably in McCardle as discussed above, is
narrow statutory interpretation.357 Moreover, as this Article has documented, the
Court has the ability to affect political debates over judicial independence by
modulating its own behavior, and even by injecting itself into such debates in
ways that help preserve its independence.358
Another issue that arises with respect to the use of historical gloss in the
context of congressional–executive relations is that it might favor the executive
branch, which for a variety of reasons can more easily engage in unilateral
action than can Congress and has more of an incentive to promote its institutional interests.359 Concerns about potential aggrandizement are more complex
when applied to the judiciary. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has an
advantage over the other branches of government: given the strong popular and
political branch support for judicial review that exists today, the Court can
purport to have the last word on the constitutional significance of practice. As a
small body with lifetime appointees, moreover, the Court is likely to have an
incentive to promote its institutional interests.360 For those reasons, the danger
of aggrandizement might seem especially acute in this context. If so, one might
object to viewing historical practice as evidence of gloss, as opposed to a
convention, on the ground that courts require the potential threat of political
interventions like Court-packing and Court-stripping to keep them sufficiently
in check, or at least to facilitate expressions of dissatisfaction with their
decisions. For example, federal courts scholar Paul Mishkin once testified that
there may not be circumstances “which would seem to me sufficient to actually
abrogate the jurisdiction, but the possibility of it, and the existence of the power,
seem to me to be healthy parts of the system,” because “there ought to be the
opportunity for Congress to direct itself to questions of jurisdiction, indeed as a
response to Court decisions.”361
On the other hand, the federal judiciary, as Alexander Hamilton noted in the
Federalist Papers, lacks power over either the sword or the purse and in that
sense is the weakest branch.362 Moreover, unlike political actors, federal judges
have limited ability to directly mobilize political constituencies, especially

357. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 576–77 (2006); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
600 (1988).
358. Recall, for example, the letter of Chief Justice Hughes that effectively refuted FDR’s claims
that the Justices needed additional personnel in order to get their work done. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
359. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 438–47.
360. But see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 963 (2005) (“[I]t is hard to see how the interests of judges would lead to a consistently
expansionist federal judiciary.”).
361. The Supreme Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 202 (1968).
362. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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because they do not sit for re-election and so must depend on the other branches
to determine their future composition. Furthermore, as illustrated by the debates
in Parts II and III, many issues relating to the judicial separation of powers
never get to the Court, so its potential ability to have the last effective word on
the meaning of the Constitution will often not come into play.
Finally, a question worth exploring is whether institutional self-restraint, as
opposed to acquiescence or waiver, plays more of a role in the context of the
judicial separation of powers than in separation of powers controversies not
concerning the courts. Much of the historical practice invoked in debates over
Court-packing and Court-stripping has involved a failure to act, not a longstanding pattern of action acquiesced in by another branch of government.363 By
contrast, action by the Executive Branch acquiesced in by Congress may be the
most common type of gloss scenario outside the context of the judicial separation of powers (such as making recess appointments, using military force, and
terminating treaties). Even so, practice-based claims resting on a pattern of
inaction are not unique to the judicial separation of powers. For example, the
historical practice credited by the Court in Zivotofsky was primarily the longstanding lack of congressional action similar to the statute at issue in that case.364
Presumably, whether institutional inaction should constitute historical gloss will
depend on the reasons for the inaction, in particular whether it was motivated by
normative concerns or instead was simply a function of the issue not having
arisen before.365
B. DISTINGUISHING AMONG GLOSS, CONVENTIONS, AND POLITICS

The previous parts of this Article also show how gloss and conventions, and
conventions and politics, are often blurred in argumentation outside the courts.
In the debates over Court-packing and Court-stripping, appeals to historical
gloss can be difficult to distinguish from appeals to constitutional conventions,
just as appeals to conventions can be difficult to distinguish from appeals to
politics. That blurring complicates efforts at categorization. Moreover, the
debates suggest that some constitutional understandings may straddle the divide
between law and conventions, or between conventions and politics, and potentially shift among those categories over time.366 Recognizing such blurring and
363. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995) (“[W]e know of no [other]
instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by
retroactive legislation. That prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference were not
understood to be constitutionally proscribed.”).
364. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015).
365. See id. at 2094 (“The weight of historical evidence indicates Congress has accepted that the
power to recognize foreign states and governments and their territorial bounds is exclusive to the
Presidency.”). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Reflections on Zivotofsky v. Kerry, Historical Gloss,
the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 2, 5 (2015) (questioning
whether historical practice supported this conclusion in Zivotofsky).
366. One development that might contribute to the shift of a practice-based norm among the
categories of politics, conventions, and gloss would be a high level of political polarization, such as
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overlap allows for a richer and more nuanced account of American constitutional law. As Parts II and III demonstrate, when one has the potential blurring
among categories in mind, it is possible to see things in hearings, reports, and
memoranda that one did not see before. At the same time, the blurring raises
important questions about when it matters whether a practice is labeled as gloss,
convention, or “mere” politics, and also about how an observer would be able to
distinguish the three.
In some contexts, precise categorization will be unnecessary. For example,
when political actors object to proposals to pack the Court or strip its jurisdiction, they can appeal to the spirit of the Constitution without committing to
whether they are making a legal claim. As recounted in Parts II and III, that
happened frequently in the debates in 1937 and 1957–1958. Blurring of the
categories is potentially useful because it allows for greater flexibility in
constitutional argumentation: actors can appeal to the Constitution without
necessarily claiming that a particular course of action is illegal, either presumptively or under all circumstances. Moreover, by being unclear about the categorization, political actors can preserve the shadow of some threat of disciplining
the federal judiciary in the future, something that would be valuable if—as
discussed in the last Section—one is concerned about the danger of judicial
aggrandizement.367 Finally, uncertainty about categorization allows room for
continued iterative evolution of the norm in interactions among the branches.
Contrary to what some have suggested, however, it is necessary in some
contexts to distinguish gloss from conventions.368 If a court is determining in
litigation whether the actions of another branch of government should be given
effect—the recess appointments at issue in Noel Canning, for example—it will
need to determine whether a potentially conflicting norm has constitutional
status. Similarly, lawyers within the executive branch, when providing advice
about whether to take executive action or to support congressional action, need
to be clear about what is and is not a legal constraint. That is why in the early

exists in contemporary American politics, when certain conventions have been under stress. See supra
note 55; infra note 387. Another development would be some sort of constitutional showdown between
branches of the government. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 991, 999 (2008). Constitutional conventions can also break down during periods of
high-stakes politics associated with changes from one constitutional order to another. See Mark
Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 & n.2, 544 (2004) (referring to
conventions as “pre-constitutional understandings,” which are “the ‘go without saying’ assumptions
that underpin working systems of constitutional government” and so are “conceptually prior to the
Constitution, . . . not necessarily temporally prior,” and arguing that “[p]olitical leaders play hardball
when they believe that they are in a position to shift from one [constitutional] order to another, or when
they believe themselves to be threatened with the possibility of such a shift”).
367. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 239 (1993) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that,
although the Court should give substantial deference to the Senate’s view of what it means to “try” an
impeachment, it should not “announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate”); id. at 253–54
(Souter, J., concurring) (similar argument).
368. Cf. Pozen, supra note 9, at 38 n.160 (“[I]t is not clear to me what hangs on the quest to
distinguish bona fide ‘historical gloss’ from the mass of constitutional conventions.”).
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1980s, as seen in Part III, Ted Olson and John Roberts argued primarily over
what the Constitution allowed Congress to do regarding the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction, and over what materials should be consulted in answering that
question. They were clear about the distinction between legality and other kinds
of arguments, even as Olson was unclear about the distinction between conventional and policy arguments.
As noted in Part I, unless one relies on a constitutional or political theory, the
categorization of a norm as a convention or as historical gloss will depend on
how participants in the practice understand the norm.369 An important piece of
evidence in making such a determination would be how critics of a contemplated breach of a norm have responded—in particular, whether they have
framed their objections in legal terms. Practice-based claims that cross party
lines may be entitled to particular weight because they are less likely to be
aimed at promoting party interests. It is significant, for example, that resistance
to Court-packing and Court-stripping was not merely partisan: Democrats
pushed back against FDR in 1937, and there was Republican opposition within
the Justice Department in the 1980s to Republican efforts in Congress to
discipline the Court.370 In discerning the constitutional views of government
actors, internal documents not intended for the public may be especially probative because they are less likely to be opportunistic. That is one reason why the
Executive Branch memoranda in 1937 and the OLC documents in the 1980s,
which concluded that Court-stripping would be constitutionally problematic, are
important. To be sure, giving greater weight to internal documents might
increase the likelihood that they will be prepared opportunistically with an eye
towards influencing assessments of historical gloss, especially if it is expected
that such documents will eventually be made public. But they are still likely to
be less self-serving than public pronouncements made at the time of a dispute.
The focus of the examples in this Article has been on constitutional reasoning
outside the courts. Judicial application of gloss and conventions would present
additional issues. Because constitutional conventions (as this Article, following
the Commonwealth tradition, has defined them) do not have legal status, they
would not be candidates for direct judicial application, although one could
imagine that they might inform sub-constitutional reasoning such as statutory
construction.371
By contrast, gloss is a potential candidate for direct judicial application, and,
as noted at the beginning of this Article, the Supreme Court has invoked it in
recent decisions. Nevertheless, there may be particular challenges associated
with judicial application of gloss concerning restrictions on Court-packing and
Court-stripping. One possible challenge is that, as documented in Parts II and

369. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
370. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 415, 455 (explaining why practice reflecting
bipartisan views has particular weight).
371. See, e.g., Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 9.
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III, the consistency of congressional action with any historic norm against
Court-packing or Court-stripping probably turns on Congress’s purpose, and it
might be difficult for courts to discern the purpose. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to analyze the extent to which courts, and not just political officials,
should conduct purpose inquiries relating to congressional limitations on the
federal judiciary. That said, it is worth noting that, despite the Court’s disinclination to consider Congress’s purpose back in McCardle, purpose inquiries (whether
objective or subjective) are substantially more common in modern, judicially
enforced constitutional law, including under the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Confrontation Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, the Due Process Clauses, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and the dormant Commerce Clause.372 It is also worth noting that some
purposes of political actors, like FDR’s in 1937, are relatively easy to discern.
Another issue implicated by judicial application of gloss concerns the potential that it will make the practice-based norm too static. The Supreme Court’s
confirmation of a practice-based norm of constitutional law may make the norm
more specific and categorical than it otherwise would be, and subsequent
practice is likely to coordinate around the Court’s decision, thus preventing
further evolution of the norm. That is part of a broader tension between any
custom-based system of law and centralized judicial review.373 As discussed
elsewhere, relatively minimalist judicial decisions relating to historical practice
may be presumptively required in order to manage the tension.374 Moreover, the
concern has less force outside the context of an accepted binding arbitrator and
thus is less relevant to claims about gloss in the political branches and in
scholarship that is not court-centered.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FEDERAL COURTS ISSUES

Beyond Court-packing and Court-stripping, the concepts of historical gloss
and constitutional conventions can shed new light on other topics relating to
judicial independence and power. For example, gloss and conventions likely
play a substantial role in explaining the permissible use of non-Article III
federal tribunals, notwithstanding language in the text of the Constitution that
arguably requires the use of Article III courts in all cases falling within the
federal judicial power that are adjudicated outside the state courts.375 Another
possible example concerns the appropriate grounds for removing a federal judge
372. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at 1080–81; Nelson, supra note 205, at 1785–86.
373. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 19, at 63.
374. See id.
375. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504–05 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]n Article
III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical practice
to the contrary.” (emphasis added)); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
70 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“In sum, this Court has identified three situations in which Art. III does
not bar the creation of legislative courts. In each of these situations, the Court has recognized certain
exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus.” (emphasis
added)).
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from office. Based in part on longstanding practice, it is assumed that federal
judges can be removed from office only through impeachment, and that impeachment cannot be used merely because of a disagreement with a judge’s decisions.376 Those assumptions endure even though it can be argued that the
Constitution’s directive that federal judges are to hold their offices during “good
Behavior” reflects an original understanding that impeachment was not the only
basis for removing federal judges.377
Yet another example may be the duties that can validly be assigned to federal
judges. For instance, service by Article III judges on the U.S. Sentencing
Commission has been deemed permissible in part because of the long history of
extrajudicial service by federal judges, as reflected both in “the historical
practice of the Founders after ratification” and in the “[s]ubsequent history.”378
In addition, historical practice may be relevant to the circumstances in which
Congress may strip the lower federal courts (as opposed to the Supreme Court)
of jurisdiction. There have been several historic instances in which Congress
has withdrawn the jurisdiction of lower federal courts apparently based on
disagreement with how those courts were deciding cases.379 Historical practice
may also inform issues of justiciability, such as standing. In Raines v. Byrd, for
example, the Court rejected legislative standing in part by observing that
members of the political branches historically had not sued under similar
circumstances.380
Focusing on the normative significance of historical practice also sheds light
on an important debate in the federal courts literature about whether Congress is
constitutionally required to vest in the federal judiciary some or all of the
judicial power referenced in Article III. Article III states that the judicial power
“shall be vested” in the Supreme Court and any lower federal courts that
Congress creates, and that this power “shall extend to” three categories of
“Cases” and six categories of “Controversies.”381 Seizing on that mandatory
language, Justice Story famously suggested that Congress was legally obliged to
vest in the federal courts “the whole judicial power . . . either in an original or in

376. See GEYH, supra note 3, at 113–70.
377. See Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72,
76 (2006).
378. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398, 400 (1989).
379. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 307–14.
380. See 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997) (“[H]istorical practice appears to cut against [appellees].”); see
also Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008) (noting, in considering
whether assignees of a claim have standing to sue, that “[w]e have often said that history and tradition
offer a meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider”); cf.
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 80 (D.D.C. 2015) (allowing suit by
House of Representatives against executive officials despite lack of historical practice supporting such a
suit because “[t]he refrain by either branch from exercising one of its options does not mean that the
option was unavailable; there will never be a history of litigation until the first lawsuit is filed”).
381. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
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appellate form.”382 That vesting theory has never gained much traction, but
Akhil Amar partially revived it in a series of articles.383 According to Amar,
Article III should be read as requiring Congress to vest the three categories of
“Cases” referred to in Article III, which would include all cases arising under
federal law, but not the six categories of “Controversies” (such as when
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship). Modern commentators have
dismissed both the Story theory and the Amar theory because of, among other
things, their inconsistency with the more limited jurisdiction that has historically been granted to the federal courts, starting with the Judiciary Act of
1789.384
From the perspective of historical gloss, however, Amar’s theory is substantially more tenable than Story’s. Whereas the federal courts have never been
vested with all of the judicial power encompassed by the “Controversies”
mentioned in Article III, since 1914 they have had the ability to review
essentially all matters encompassed by the three categories of “Cases” referred
to in Article III.385 Just as in Noel Canning, where historical gloss was identified
primarily on the basis of the past seventy-five years of presidential removal
practice,386 gloss potentially supports Amar’s theory given its consistency with
the past century of jurisdictional practice. That key point is missed if historical
practice is considered only for its connection to the constitutional Founding.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and courts have increasingly recognized that the conduct of government institutions over time can play an important role in defining understandings of the separation of powers. Such conduct can result in the development of
either “historical gloss” or “constitutional conventions.” As this Article has
explained, gloss and conventions are categories of practice-based norms that
overlap but that are analytically distinct. To date, much of the scholarly and
judicial attention to gloss and conventions has focused on the relationship
between Congress and the executive branch.
The federal judiciary, however, is also an important component of the federal
separation of powers. Debates over Court-packing and Court-stripping illustrate
382. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816); see also FALLON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 309 (discussing this aspect of the reasoning in Hunter’s Lessee).
383. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 208–09 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are
Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1652 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1503–05 (1990).
384. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569,
1585 (1990).
385. As discussed in Section III.B, in 1914 Congress for the first time gave the Court jurisdiction to
hear appeals from state courts in cases in which state courts held in favor of federal claims.
386. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564 (2014) (“[T]hree-quarters of a century of
settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’ of the
constitutional provision.” (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929))).
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how the historical practices of government institutions, including their principled decisions not to act and their concerns about creating or following
“negative precedent,” play an important role in interpretive debates relating to
what this Article calls the judicial separation of powers.387 More generally,
those debates confirm that, in the context of the separation of powers, sharp
distinctions between law and politics tend to be oversimplified. Not only are
there at least three categories, not two, but the arguments of some participants in
separation of powers disputes strikingly reflect the uncertain boundaries between gloss and conventions, and between conventions and politics.

387. This Article does not consider whether high levels of polarization stifle constitutional or
conventional inquiry by political actors. Notably, however, no Court-curbing proposals have gained
traction in Congress during the current period of polarization, despite controversy over a number of
judicial decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 12–13. As this Article was being edited in the fall
of 2016, Donald Trump had been elected President, and the Republicans had maintained their
majorities in both houses of Congress. While other constitutional and conventional norms seemed
potentially at risk in the wake of the highly contentious presidential campaign, there was no specific
challenge to norms against Court-curbing.

